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A central aspect of firm-consumer communications is the extent to which the consumer believes the firm. In this 
dissertation, I argue that belief, more specifically a consumer’s belief in claims or material generated by the firm, 
should be more adequately examined in contemporary consumer behavior literature. To this end, I review current 
theories that attempt to understand belief in consumer behavior literature. Furthermore, I explore two empirical 
examinations of how certain factors influence consumers’ belief in firm-generated communication and how 
differing levels of belief affect consumer behavior—first in the service failure context and second in the scarcity 
signaling context. 
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CHAPTER 1: 
Introduction to Believability 
 
A central aspect of firm-consumer communications is the extent to which the consumer 
believes the firm. In this dissertation, I argue that belief, more specifically a consumer’s belief in 
claims or material generated by the firm, should be more adequately examined in contemporary 
consumer behavior literature. To this end, I will review current theories that attempt to 
understand belief in consumer behavior literature. Furthermore, I will explore two empirical 
examinations of how certain factors influence consumers’ belief in firm-generated 
communication and how differing levels of belief affect consumer behavior—first in the service 
failure context and second in the scarcity signaling context. The goal is to better understand the 
relationship between belief and consumer behavior, and, in particular, how belief can be 
managed more appropriately from both a managerial and a consumer standpoint. If I can show 
that belief affects consumer interactions with the firm, we will be better able to understand and 
control this latent construct, which has been underexplored. 
BELIEF THEORY 
 Belief is a broad topic—Merriam-Webster defines belief as, “a state or habit of mind in 
which trust or confidence is placed in some person or thing” (Merriam-Webster 2017). This 
definition highlights many key elements of belief—first, it qualifies belief as a habit. Much of 
academic literature, at least literature which is psychological in nature, studies habits in one form 
or another. Consumer behavior researchers are familiar with habits (Campbell and Cochrane 
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1999; Ouellette and Wood 1998). Therefore, if we think of belief as simply a habit, the topic is 
not as daunting as one might initially assume. Belief is just the habit of people to place trust in 
something. This ideology might portray belief as in a more long-term inflexible construct—for 
example, believing in a higher-power. However, this research focuses on belief in the veracity of 
a message or communication. This could be long-term (i.e. I believe my wife tells me the truth) 
or short term (i.e. I don’t believe she told me the truth, yesterday). 
The second key element of this definition is the “thing”, or object of belief, that we are 
placing trust in is subjective. For example, if a consumer buys an item via an online market place 
that hosts a variety of sellers and reviews, whom are they placing their belief in? One might 
argue that they believe in the market place, the sellers, the reviewers, and the capitalist system as 
a whole (Gefen, Karahanna, and Straub 2003). Although habits are generalizable, people will not 
generally believe an individual unless given reason to place their trust in that individual. 
Belief has a bidirectional relationship with trust. Oftentimes, these two terms are thought 
of as synonymous. However, belief is more transient in nature than trust. Typically, through 
repeated demonstrating the belief in a person or a thing is well placed, people develop trust. Or 
someone is trusted, they can most likely be believed. It is worth noting that throughout this 
essay, this form of belief is paramount. Specifically, do consumers believe this 
statement/claim/firm/representative? 
MARKETING THEORY 
 Although, some people might have general tendencies to believe others, or general 
tendencies to believe specific firms, it would be erroneous to assume that all consumers 
inherently believe claims generated by the firm. In fact, any context in which a firm might 
Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation 
 
benefit from dishonesty is one in which consumer disbelief may arise (Fein and Hilton 1994; 
Fein 1996; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990; Main, Dahl, and Darke 2007). This is the fundamental 
ideology behind one of the most influential works in consumer behavior—The Persuasion 
Knowledge Model (PKM). PKM investigates consumers’ awareness about the strategies and 
tactics that firms employ to convince them to buy a product and the motives behind such 
strategies (Friestad and Wright 1994). This model begins to address consumers’ personal 
knowledge related to firms’ goals and tactics and the skepticism, or disbelief, which might arise 
from the use of such strategies. The PKM states that when confronted with a persuasion attempt, 
consumers recall and refine their knowledge on persuasive tactics to generate the appropriate 
response to the persuasive messages. Simultaneously, consumers dynamically adjust their 
attitudes toward the product and the firm based on the persuasive appeal and consumers’ 
knowledge associated with such appeals (1994). 
Surprisingly, belief is often either ignored or taken for granted in research in non-
persuasive firm-consumer communication domains such as social media (Kaplan and Haenlein 
2010; Kietzmann et al. 2011), customer service (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995), and 
service failure recovery (Folkes 1984; Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004; Umashankar, Srinivasan, 
and Parker 2016). However, perceptions of being deceived, regardless of reality, can create 
intense negative emotional reactions (Levine, McCornack, and Avery 1992; McCornack and 
Levine 1990) and can lead to resentment, disappointment, and suspicion (Bok 2011). 
Furthermore, research shows that a brand’s credibility affects the formation of consideration sets 
(Erdem and Swait 2004). Therefore, a firm that is prone to unbelievable communications will 
undoubtedly see an impact in the willingness of consumers to trust them but also purchase from 
them, effecting market share and profit margins (Chaudhuri and Holbrook 2001). 
Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior 
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There are two forms of belief in marketing research—belief as a function of source 
credibility and belief as a function of information characteristics. Source credibility refers to the 
expertise, trustworthiness, or objectivity of the source of information. A credible source of 
information can give consumers confidence that the information is accurate. For example, a 
consumer that is not familiar with a product can be easily persuaded of its quality by a credible 
source (Ratneshwar and Chaiken 1991). There are a plethora of way to manipulate a source’s 
credibility, from something as simple as altering their likeability by hiring a celebrity to deliver 
the message to more complex utilizations of social media to make it appear that a brand is 
endorsed by consumers’ personal acquaintances. In the following research, I am interested in 
belief as a function of source credibility and belief as a function of information characteristics. If 
the information is presented in a certain way, it can alter the likelihood that a consumer will 
believe the message. For example, at the end of most drug advertisements, the potential side 
effects of the drug are listed rapidly (ie. Diarrhea, Nausea, and Death). Given that these are so 
quickly presented, it might indicate that the messenger is untrustworthy and has underhanded 
motives (Herbst et al. 2011). Throughout the next three chapters of this dissertation, many 
examples will be given of this form of belief manipulation. 
RESEARCH 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I examine the extent to which consumers’ 
beliefs of the claims made by a point of contact (POC) evolve over repeated service failures. I 
draw on literature from deception detection (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Ekman 2009) and 
coincidence (Dessalles 2006; Dessalles 2008; Dimulescu and Dessalles 2009) to propose that 
consumers are more likely to believe a POC when the POC gives different (vs. the same) reasons 
for each of the service failures. Specifically, this dissertation aims to establish that ostensible 
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coincidences (the same reason given repeatedly for service failures) provided by the POC lead 
consumers to discount these explanations for the service failures. The second chapter of this 
dissertation examines the idea that consumers find ostensible coincidences less believable 
despite that such coincidences suggest a systemic cause for the service failure that is both more 
likely and more expected by the consumer a priori. Further, when presented with an ostensible 
coincidence, consumers are more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.  
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I conduct research that outlines the extent to 
which consumers’ beliefs of scarcity signals presented by a firm differ based on the manner in 
which those signals are delivered. Drawing on literature from creativity (Goldenberg, Mazursky, 
and Solomon 1999a, 1999b) and persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1994; Chaiken et al. 1987; 
Petty and Cacioppo 1986), I theorize that consumers are more likely to believe implicit (vs. 
explicit) scarcity signals. Specifically, implicit scarcity signals require the consumer to engage in 
the communication and alter the perceived source and intention of the scarcity signal. The 
consumer will no longer feel the source of the scarcity signal is the firm and that the intentions 
are to persuade the consumer. Further, when presented with an implicit scarcity signal, 
consumers should be more likely to believe the signal is authentic and alter their purchasing 
behavior to match previous scarcity literature.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
“You're Not Going to Believe This: Ostensible Coincidences Reduce Belief in Reasons Given 
for Service Failures” 
 
A critical concern of managers is their firms’ communications with consumers, which 
can range in scope from mass-media advertisements down to one-to-one communications 
between consumers and the firm’s customer-service representatives. A central aspect of firm-
consumer communications is the extent to which the consumer believes the firm’s claims. It is 
unsurprising then that belief is one of the primary latent constructs of interest in much research 
on persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1995) and advertising (Mitchell and Olson 2000). However, 
belief is often either ignored or taken for granted in research on other firm-consumer 
communication domains such as social media (Kaplan and Haenlein 2010; Kietzmann et al. 
2011), customer service (Blodgett, Wakefield, and Barnes 1995), and service failure recovery 
(Folkes 1984; Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004; Umashankar, Srinivasan, and Parker 2016). Yet, it 
would be erroneous to assume that consumers inherently believe claims generated by the firm, or 
one of its representatives, in such non-persuasion contexts. In fact, any context in which an entity 
(the firm) might benefit from dishonesty is one in which consumer disbelief may arise (Fein and 
Hilton 1994; Fein 1996; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990; Main, Dahl, and Darke 2007). Here I 
focus on firm-consumer interactions after service failures and ask: To what extent do consumers 
believe the reasons firms give them for service failures?  
Generally speaking, research on service failures and recoveries treats the brand as a 
single, holistic entity. However, in reality, firms are comprised of numerous employees that 
Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation 
 
differ in the amount of direct contact they have with the firm’s customers. Moreover, consumers 
interact with individual employees, not abstract firms, brands, or companies. Accordingly, the 
current research examines interactions between the consumer and a firm’s representative. More 
specifically, this essay examine consumers’ belief of the claims made by a representative of the 
firm after each of several minor but repeated service failures. 
Be it for reasons of convenience (Mitchell 1979), loyalty (Jacoby and Chestnut 1978), or 
habit (Hoyer 1984), consumers often repeatedly do business with the same firm (e.g., restaurant, 
store, or website) from whom they purchase the same or similar items (e.g., products, services, or 
both). It is not uncommon for recurring firm-consumer relationships to involve repeated 
interactions between the consumer and the same firm representative (hereafter, point-of-contact 
or POC) over time. For instance, consumers regularly interact the same salesperson (POC) when 
making repeated purchases from a car dealership (e.g., when buying multiple cars for spouses 
and children). Likewise, companies such as Dell typically establish a single customer-service or 
technical-support representative (POC) for customers making purchases or seeking technical 
assistance. These POCs walk the consumer through the entire process and are often designated as 
the POC for future interactions, should the need arise. A more ubiquitous example is the 
consumer that frequents a specific restaurant; often that consumer will be waited on by the same 
server (POC) on numerous occasions. In short, it is not only common for consumers to 
repeatedly interact with specific firms, but also with specific POCs within those firms. 
Recurring firm-consumer relationships are typically sustained by positive experiences 
with the firm, but repeated interactions also allow for the possibility of repeated, relatively minor 
service failures (e.g., long wait times, incorrect orders, or rude service). While minor failures are 
not ideal, they are less likely to result in the immediate termination of the firm-consumer 
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relationship than more severe failures (Smith, Bolton, and Wagner 1999) and, therefore, are 
more likely to be tolerated, ceteris paribus. Thus, the context of repeated service failures is not a 
contrived one, and has received some attention in previous literature (Maxham III and 
Netemeyer 2002). In many, if not most, cases service failures are followed by communication 
between the firm’s POC and the consumer, which is likely to involve an explanation of the 
failure and, where appropriate, an apology from the firm (Folkes 1984). The question examined 
here is to what extent does the consumer believe the POC’s explanation for the failure and how 
does that belief evolve over repeated service failures? 
Consider the following simple yet familiar scenario. A consumer has dined at a restaurant 
regularly for some time. Generally, the experience has been pleasant but this consumer has had 
to wait an excessive amount of time for her food on her last three visits, during each of which the 
consumer was waited on by the same server. The consumer could reasonably believe these 
delays were caused by either the server or the kitchen staff. Yet, only the server is in direct 
contact with the consumer. Thus, the ostensible reasons—the excuses, if you will—for the 
delayed meals will come from the server, not the kitchen staff. For simplicity, imagine that the 
server indicates that the delay is the fault of the kitchen in all three instances. With this context in 
mind, the focal question is whether ostensible causal coincidence (i.e., the same reason is given 
by the same source—the server in this example—for repeated service failures) versus ostensible 
causal discordance (i.e., different reasons are given by the same source for each of the service 
failures) in those reasons influence the extent to which the consumer believes them (and, 
equivalently, their source). In other words, are consumers more likely to believe the server if 
they give the same reason for all three failures (e.g., “The kitchen forgot your order.”) or 
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different reasons for each failure (e.g., “The kitchen forgot the order,” “The kitchen staff made 
the order incorrectly,” and “The kitchen staff dropped the order.”)? 
Objectively speaking, it could be argued that a single reason for multiple failures is more 
believable as it would signal a systemic issue, which parsimoniously explains the repeated 
service failures. Moreover, it seems more likely that a repeat consumer could be the recurrent 
victim of a systemic issue than the victim of three distinct, if not necessarily independent, events 
generating similar consequences (excessive waits in the above example). Yet, I demonstrate that 
consumers are more likely to believe the server (POC) when the server (POC) gives different (vs. 
the same) reasons for each of the service failures. I argue that consumers’ intuitive lay beliefs 
about ostensible coincidences lead them to discount or neglect parsimonious explanations (a 
systemic issue) for repeated service failures. Instead, for reasons detailed in this paper, 
consumers find coincidences to be unexpected and, therefore, should find ostensible 
coincidences less believable. Consequently, the consumer is less likely to believe the POC (the 
server in the above example) and, in fact, more likely to blame the POC for the service failure. 
THEORY 
 Scant research has examined how consumers cope with the uncertainty inherently 
surrounding the causes of service failures. Indeed, most service failure research either (i) takes it 
as a given that the cause of the failure is unambiguously known and examines factors influencing 
how consumers respond to the failure and subsequent recovery efforts (Smith, Bolton, and 
Wagner 1999; Maxham III and Netemeyer 2002) or (ii) examines the extent to which consumers 
attribute the blame for the failure to the firm versus themselves (Folkes 1984; Pham et al. 2010; 
Tsiros, Mittal, and Ross 2004). However, in reality, consumers are likely to recognize that there 
may exist a disconnect between what they are told and what actually caused a service failure. 
Believability: A Study of Coincidence and Scarcity in Consumer Behavior 
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Hence, consumers may have grounds to disbelieve reasons they are given for failures, which may 
influence which individuals or entities within the firm they blame for the failure. 
Notably, the reasons given for a service failure commonly originate from a single point-
of-contact (POC) within the firm. The POC is typically responsible for many aspects of 
successfully delivering the firm’s product or service. Concurrently, there is typically a group of 
individuals responsible for the production or creation of the firm’s services or products that do 
not interact with the customer directly. Thus, when a service failure occurs, it may be the fault of 
the POC or of another employee or group within the firm.  
The current work examines the context of repeated minor service failures, each of which 
is followed by the firm’s POC providing an ostensible cause for the failure. I am particularly 
interested in situations in which the repeated service failures could plausibly have been caused 
by the actions of the POC, but the POC attributes the causes of those failures to employees or 
groups other than themselves. Such instances are interesting because the POC has obvious 
motives for deflecting blame if he or she personally caused the service failures (e.g., avoiding 
customer complaints or anger directed at them), but could also be telling the truth when 
indicating that others in the firm caused the failures. Hence, in these circumstances, the 
consumer may either choose to believe the POC or, instead, infer that the POC is deflecting 
blame. The question then is when and why would the consumer be more or less likely to believe 
the ostensible causes provided by the POC? Part of the answer to that question lies in research on 
individuals’ abilities to detect deception. 
Deception Detection. Lying is a common occurrence—people lie one to two times a day 
on average (DePaulo and Kashy 1998)—and perceptions of being deceived, regardless of reality, 
can create intense negative emotional reactions (Levine, McCornack, and Avery 1992; 
Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation 
 
McCornack and Levine 1990) and can lead to resentment, disappointment, and suspicion (Bok 
2011). Yet, “behavioral cues that are discernible by human perceivers are associated with deceit 
only probabilistically” (DePaulo et al. 2003). Accordingly, substantial research has focused on 
the cues that people use to determine if someone is being deceptive (e.g.(Trovillo 1939)).  
Much of the research on deception detection centers on verbal and nonverbal cues of 
deception (Zuckerman, DePaulo, and Rosenthal 1981). Eye contact (Kleinke 1986), tone of voice 
(Anolli and Ciceri 1997), and facial expressions (Ekman 2003) can all indicate that deception 
may be occurring (Ekman 2009). However, deception detection research also examines cues 
related to the content of the potential deception, such as the amount of detail in a story (Burgoon 
et al. 2003), the wordiness of a story (Zhou et al. 2004), or the compelling nature of the story 
(Mehrabian 1977). Content cues often reveal more insight into what a liar is trying to hide in 
addition to indicating that they are simply trying to hide something (Ekman and Friesen 1969). 
Here, I examine a heretofore unexamined content cue: the presence versus absence of 
coincidence in the message.  
Coincidences: Actual and Ostensible. In the most objective sense, coincidences are 
merely the occurrence of two or more things at the same time. However, colloquially, the term 
“coincidence” conveys a sense of unexpectedness with the co-occurrence. In other words, 
coincidences are not merely the co-occurrence of any two or more events—they are a co-
occurrence of events that was unexpected. To this end, the Cambridge Dictionary formally 
defines coincidences as events co-occurring “in a way that is unexpected or unlikely.” Dessalles 
(2006) characterized such unexpected co-occurring events in terms of their generation 
complexity (How many things needed to happen for the co-occurrence to arise?) and description 
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complexity (How difficult is it to describe the co-occurrence?). The distinction between these two 
types of complexity is best conveyed via an example.  
Imagine two friends: Nick who lives in Boulder, Colorado and Dan who lives in Chicago, 
Illinois. One day, Nick takes a trip to San Francisco and, as he is checking into his hotel, Dan 
walks up to also check into the same hotel. Assuming that Nick and Dan had not coordinated 
their travels, it is reasonable to assume that both would be pleasantly surprised by this co-
occurrence. It would be quite unexpected, in fact, since neither of these friends lives near San 
Francisco. Now, think of the complexity of generating this co-occurrence. Both friends would 
have needed to independently decide to travel to San Francisco, plan travel accommodations 
from their respective home cities, choose to stay at the same hotel, and decide to travel on the 
same date. Accordingly, each friend’s reasoning in terms of location and timing are also 
necessary to generate this co-occurrence. In sum, it is no simple matter that Nick and Dan 
arrived at this same hotel at the same time. As they say, “What are the odds?” However, an 
observer would simply need to say, “Nick and Dan were booked at the same hotel at the same 
time in San Francisco,” to describe the co-occurrence. Dimulescu and Dessalles (2009) have 
argued that co-occurrences of this nature—far greater generation complexity than description 
complexity—are those which generate the unexpectedness so commonly associated with 
coincidences. 
A critical finding of Dassalles’s (2008) is that the unexpectedness of a coincidence is 
diminished when the apparent generation complexity is reduced via a parsimonious explanation. 
For instance, if an observer were to learn that Nick and Dan in the preceding example were both 
attending the same conference, then the generation complexity would be reduced (they’d both be 
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operating under the same reasoning and motivation), as would the unexpectedness of them both 
arriving at the same hotel at the same time. I will return to this insight later. 
While actual coincidences are interesting, the current work examines coincidences that 
are conveyed indirectly (i.e., are ostensible) via a firm’s POC (the restaurant server in the earlier 
example). A critical difference between actual and ostensible coincidences is that the former may 
be unexpected, but it cannot be denied. In the context of the Nick and Dan example, a witness 
that saw Nick and Dan arrive at the same hotel, could not deny the co-occurring events. In 
contrast, while ostensible coincidences should also be unexpected, it is also true that their 
veracity may be questioned. 
Of interest here, are ostensible causal coincidences, which are coincidences in which the 
same (or similar) outcomes for the consumer (e.g., service failures) have been repeatedly 
attributed to the same cause by a firm’s POC. Critically, it is far from improbably that a systemic 
issue has caused the consumer to experience these repeated service failures. Indeed, were the 
cause directly observable, the consumer might readily accept the apparent coincidence given 
such a parsimonious explanation, as discussed above. However, ostensible coincidences are not 
observable and, instead, are conveyed by a second party—the POC—reasonably motivated to 
deflect blame. Accordingly, the consumer has at their disposal two plausible parsimonious 
explanations for the ostensible coincidence. On the one hand, the service failures may have in 
fact all been caused by the same systemic issue. On the other hand, they may have been caused 
by the POC, who has merely deflected blame to others. 
I contend that, since coincidences are unexpected, ostensible causal coincidences are 
perceived as suspicious and consumers are likely to doubt the authenticity of the POC’s claims in 
such contexts. Therefore, in scenarios of ostensible causal coincidence (i.e., the same reason is 
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given by the same POC for the same repeated service failures), when the factors of the 
coincidence are highly aligned across each separate interaction, the consumer will believe the 
POC less. Conversely, in scenarios of relative ostensible causal discordance (i.e., different 
reasons are given by the same source for the same repeated service failures), when the factors of 
the coincidence are less aligned across each separate interaction, the consumer will believe the 
POC more. 
Figure 1: Conceptual Map 
 
 
I tested the predictions regarding ostensible causal coincidences for repeated service 
failures across five studies. Study 1 demonstrates that consumers are (i) less likely to believe a 
POC (a restaurant server) that presents the same reason for late orders on three repeat visits than 
different reasons and (ii) more likely to blame the server presenting the same reason versus 
different reasons while (iii) exonerating the kitchen staff of responsibility. Study 2, using the 
same restaurant context, replicates the findings of Study 1 and concurrently examines how belief 
in the reasons given for service failures changes over the course of those service failures. Study 3 
generalizes these findings to a new context (visiting a hotel that was booked by a travel agent). 
Study 4 demonstrates that these findings are a product of the level of coincidence by 
manipulating additional factors (i.e., the number of POCs conveying the reasons for the failures) 
that can mitigate the apparent coincidence of the situation. Study 5 demonstrates that consumers 
will predict that a single systemic reason is the most likely cause for repeated service failures, 
but still do not believe it when the single reason is presented to them by a POC. 
 
Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation 
 
STUDIES 
Study 1: Coincidence and Deception Detection 
 In order to investigate the theory that disbelief stems from a coincidence being relayed 
via a POC, an experiment was developed that placed participants in a hypothetical scenario 
similar to the restaurant example in the introduction. The goals of this study were to demonstrate 
the hypothesis that people are less likely to believe a single repeated reason than different 
reasons for multiple service failures from the same source. Furthermore, people are more likely 
to blame the source offering them a single (vs. different) reason for multiple service failures. 
Study 1 further demonstrates that the reason used to explain the delay in service was not the 
cause of the findings. 
Table 1: Example of Reasons for Food Being Late 
 Date What your server said about the wait 
Visit A 09/01/2015 
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as 
soon as it’s ready.” 
Visit B 09/15/2015 
“A cook dropped your food in the kitchen. I will bring your food out 
as soon as it’s ready.” 
Visit C 09/30/2015 
“The kitchen made a mistake and had to remake your food. I will 
bring your food out as soon as it’s ready.” 
   
Method. One hundred sixty-three paid participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Twelve participants were removed from the analysis for failing to respond to 
all questions, leaving one hundred fifty-one participants. Participants were asked to imagine they 
had visited a local restaurant on three different occasions. During each visit the participants had 
the same server and had to wait an excessively long time for their orders. Participants were 
presented with a table, similar to Table 1, that either stated three different reasons for their food 
being late or one reason for their food being late on each visit. Participants were randomly 
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assigned to one of four conditions—the first condition presented a scenario identical to Table 1, 
where a different reason was given for each delay in service (diffReas). The other three 
conditions presented participants with the same reason given for the delay in service across all 
visits. Each individual reason presented in the different reasons condition was represented in a 
single reason condition; the kitchen forgot order (kitchenForgot), a cook dropped the order in the 
kitchen (cookDrop), and the kitchen made a mistake and had to remake the order 
(kitchenMistake). An example can be seen in Table 2.  
Table 2: Example of Reasons for Food Being Late (kitchenForgot) 
 Date What your server said about the wait 
Visit A 09/01/2015 
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as 
soon as it’s ready.” 
Visit B 09/15/2015 
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as 
soon as it’s ready.” 
Visit C 09/30/2015 
“The kitchen forgot about your order. I will bring your food out as 
soon as it’s ready.” 
 
Participants then indicated how much they believed the reason given for the delay during 
each specific visit on an eleven point scale ranging from “completely do NOT believe (-5)” to 
“completely believe (5).”On another screen participants were asked to indicate their overall 
belief of the reasons the server gave for their food being late on a similar scale to the one utilized 
for the prior question. On this same page they were asked to indicate server fault and kitchen 
fault for the service failure on two separate eleven point scales ranging from “not the server’s 
(kitchen’s) fault at all (-5)” to “completely the server’s (kitchen’s) fault at all (5).” Participants 
were also asked why they believed the food was delayed during the visit to the restaurant in an 
open-ended text based response question. On a separate page, participants were asked an 
attention check question, their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation. 
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Figure 2: Mean of Reason Believe Across Visits 
 
Results. The theory pertains to how belief responds to ostensible coincidence. Hence, this 
essay does not examine raw belief in the reasons given by the server (e.g., how believable it is 
that a kitchen forgets an order) but, instead, focus on the evolution of belief. Specifically, one’s 
belief in the reason given for each service failure should decrease to the extent to which that 
reason coincides with the reasons given for previously experienced failures. Accordingly, the 
primary interest lies in how belief in the reasons given for the service failures changed from the 
first visit (Visit A) to the subsequent visits (Visits B and C). 
Belief in the reasons given by the server at each individual visit evolved in a manner 
consistent with the prediction (Figure 2). A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, four-
level, between-subjects “reasons” factor (diffReas vs. kitchenForgot vs. cookDrop vs. 
kitchenMistake) and the three-level within-subjects repeated measure of belief in the reasons 
given. The mixed-ANOVA revealed the expected interaction (F(6, 294) = 12.82, p < .001), 
which indicates that participants’ belief in the reasons they were given evolved differently across 
visits depending on the number of reasons they were given.  
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The change in belief from Visit A to Visit B (i.e., belief after Visit B minus belief after 
Visit A; hereafter, ΔVisit B) varied significantly across conditions (MdiffReas= -.72, MkitchenForgot= -
2.73, McookDrop= -3.55, MkitchenMistake= -2.06, F(3,147) = 8.6, p < .0001). In the interest of brevity, I 
collapsed the three single-reason conditions and contrasted them with the different-reasons 
condition (the same results obtain if the different reason condition is independently contrasted 
with each single reason condition). As expected, ΔVisit B was significantly less negative in the 
different-reasons (vs. single-reason) condition (F(1,147) = 18.81, p < .0001). An identical 
analysis of ΔVisit C (i.e., belief after Visit C minus belief after Visit A) revealed the same 
pattern across all conditions (MdiffReas= -.44, MkitchenForgot= -4.37, McookDrop= -6.03, MkitchenMistake= -
4.36, F(3,147) = 15.72, p < .0001) and after collapsing across the single-reason conditions 
(F(1,147) = 41.85, p < .0001). Taken together these results show that consumers have 
progressively less belief in repeated identical reasons for service failures. Said differently, 
consumers are more likely to believe the reasons they are given for multiple service failures if 
those reasons differ over the various incidences. 
Figure 3: Mean of Server Belief Across Conditions 
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Consistent with the predictions, participants’ overall belief (a single measure collected 
after participants indicated their belief in the specific reasons given for each service failure) in 
the server’s reasons also varied significantly across conditions (MdiffReas= .33, MkitchenForgot= -1.9, 
McookDrop= -3.26, MkitchenMistake= -1.75, F(3,147) = 10.9, p < .0001). Participant’s overall belief in 
the three reason condition differed significantly from each single reason condition—the 
kitchenForgot condition (F(1,147) = 12.88, p < .0006), the cookDrop condition (F(1,147) = 
32.14, p < .0001), and the kitchenMistake condition (F(1,147) = 10.50, p < .0016). These results, 
illustrated in Figure 3, replicate the above visit-specific belief results, but at a more aggregate, 
overall level of belief. 
Discussion. The results of Study 1 support the proposition that consumers are less likely 
to believe a single (vs. different) reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Study 1 
also starts to develop a more compelling narrative around the observed phenomenon by 
examining how belief changed over the course of visits to the restaurant and communication with 
the server. However, the evolution of belief across visits was not measured over time, as the 
reasons were provided. Therefore, Studies 2 will examine if the findings hold when individuals 
are asked to indicate belief for individual reasons given during each visit as the service failures 
are revealed. 
Study 2: Deception Detection Within Subjects 
 Method. Eighty paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Two 
participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete responses (final N = 78). Similar 
to Study 1, this study asked participants to imagine they had visited a local restaurant on three 
different occasions. Each visit was then described one at a time, each on a separate screen. Each 
visit description included an excessively long wait time and the server’s reason for that wait 
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time. The participants rated their belief in the reason they were given for the long wait (on the 
same scale used in Study 1, before proceeding to read about the subsequent visit. An example of 
the first visit can be seen in Table 3. 
Table 3: Example Reason for Food Being Late 
 Date What your server said about the wait 
Visit A 09/01/2015 “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
 
Additionally, participants were asked to indicate if the delay was the server’s fault or the 
kitchen’s fault after reading about each visit. Furthermore, participants were asked in an open 
text item to indicate the reason they believed their food was delayed during that specific visit. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the first condition a 
different reason was given for each delay in service (diffReas). In the other condition, 
participants were given the same reason for the delay in service across all visits (sameReas). For 
simplicity, I chose to include only one single-reason condition, which used “the kitchen forgot 
the order” reason for all service failures. 
Figure 4: Mean of Server Belief Across Conditions and Visits 
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Results. Consistent with the results of Study 1, a mixed ANOVA revealed a significant 
interaction between the two-level, between-subjects “reasons” factor (one vs. different reasons) 
and the repeated within-subjects measure of belief (F(2,156) = 4.40, p < .02)—more specifically, 
participants who were shown the same reason for their food being delayed during each visit 
began to believe their server less in a more exaggerated manner than those in the different-
reasons condition (Figure 4). Contrasting belief across conditions at each visit, we see that the 
difference in the participants’ belief in the server’s reason given during their second visit (ΔVisit 
B) did not differ significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -1.80, MdiffReas= -.58, F(1,78) 2.18 = p 
> .14). However, the difference in the participants’ belief in the server’s reason given during 
their third visit (ΔVisit C) differed significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -3.88, MdiffReas= -
1.45, F(1,78) 6.95 = p < .02). These findings replicate the pattern of belief results from Study 1.  
Figure 5: Mean of Server Fault Across Conditions and Visits 
 
Fault was analyzed in the same manner as was belief. As seen in Figure 5, the evolution 
of server’s fault follows a reverse pattern to that of belief—in that it escalates over time. 
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a mixed ANOVA, differed significantly across conditions (F(2,156) = 7.14, p < .002). More 
specifically, participants who were shown the same reason for their food being delayed during 
each visit began to blame their server in a more exaggerated manner than those in the different 
reasons condition. The difference in the participants’ attribution of fault to server during their 
second visit (ΔVisit B) varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= 1.50, MdiffReas= -1.00, 
F(1,78) 12.01 = p < .001). Similarly, difference in the participants’ attribution of fault to server 
during their third visit (ΔVisit C) varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= 2.58, 
MdiffReas= -.45, F(1,78) 7.21 = p < .009). 
Figure 6: Mean of Kitchen Fault Across Conditions and Visits 
 
Finally, as illustrated in Figure 6, the evolution of kitchen’s fault follows the reverse 
pattern to that of server fault. Participants’ evolution of the fault they placed on the kitchen for 
their delayed food, per a mixed ANOVA, differed significantly across conditions (F(2,156) = 
5.44, p < .006). More specifically, participants who were shown the same reason for their food 
being delayed during each visit began to exonerate the kitchen of fault more than those in the 
different reasons condition. The difference in the participants’ attribution of fault to kitchen 
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during their second visit varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -1.65, MdiffReas= -.05, 
F(1,78) 4.05 = p < .05). Similarly, difference in the participant’s attribution of fault to kitchen 
during their third visit varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -3.30, MdiffReas= -.78, 
F(1,78) 8.62 = p < .005). 
Discussion. The results of Study 2 support the theory that consumers are less likely to 
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Further this study 
demonstrates that these findings hold when measuring belief as the events unfold while 
solidifying the more business oriented dependent variable of fault. Study 3 examines whether 
these findings generalize to contexts other than the restaurant context examined thus far. 
Study 3: Deception Detection vs. Unbelievable Reason (Hotel Context) 
Study 3 was designed to generalize the results of the preceding studies to a new context. 
Specifically, two aspects of the study were changed. First, I stepped away from the restaurant 
context into a context in which participants were asked to imagine that they are often required to 
travel to a foreign city for work using the same travel coordinator to book the same hotel. Thus, I 
changed the setting of the service failure. Second, since the travel coordinator and the hotel do 
not represent a single firm, I have also shifted from a single-firm context to a two-firm context. 
As in the previous studies, the participant still hypothetically interacted with a single POC (i.e., 
the travel coordinator). But, as opposed to the previous studies, the third party (which would 
ultimately be blamed for repeated service failures by the POC) was a hotel for which the travel 
coordinator was not employed. While this context does differ from the other studies, it retains the 
essential elements of those studies and, thus, I predicted that the results of the preceding studies 
would be replicated. 
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Method. One hundred thirty-one paid participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Eight participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete 
responses (final N = 123). In a deviation from the other studies conducted throughout this paper, 
this study asked participants to imagine that they had upcoming business trips to Madrid, Spain. 
Their company had instructed them to book their itinerary through the same travel coordinator 
each trip, whom then booked the participants at the same hotel. Upon arrival for each business 
trip, the participants were told they had to wait an excessively long time for their room to be 
available. During these waits the travel coordinator talked to the hotel staff over the phone. 
Participants were then told that the coordinator gave them the reason for their long wait for each 
stay. 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the first condition gave 
different reasons for each delay in service (diffReas—“The hotel had lost your reservation,” 
“The hotel had booked your reservation under the wrong name,” “The hotel had booked your 
reservation for the wrong dates”). The other condition gave participants the same reason given 
for the delay in service across all visits (sameReas—“The hotel had lost your reservation”). 
After seeing a table of these reasons for each visit, the participants were asked to indicate to what 
extent they believed the reason the travel coordinator gave for the delay in service on a scale 
similar to that of Study 1 and 2. 
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Figure 7: Mean of Travel Agent Belief Across Conditions and Visits 
  
Results. Consistent with the results of Study 1 and 2, a mixed-analysis ANOVA revealed 
a significant interaction between the between-subjects “reasons” factor and the repeated within-
subjects measure of belief (F(2,242) = 16.21, p < .0001; Figure 7): participants who were shown 
the same reason for their room being delayed during each visit began to believe their travel agent 
less in a more exaggerated manner than those in the different reasons condition. The difference 
in the participant’s belief (Δ) in the travel coordinator’s reason given related to their second visit 
varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -2.42, MdiffReas= -.85, F(1,121) 14.40 = p < 
.0002). Consistently, the difference in the participant’s belief in the travel coordinator’s reason 
given related their third visit varied significantly across conditions (MsameReas= -4.17, MdiffReas= -
1.34, F(1,121) 18.51 = p < .0001). During both the second and third visits, the travel 
coordinator’s reason for the delay in their room was less believable if participants were given the 
same reason as the previous visit. 
Discussion. The results of Study 3 support the theory that consumers are less likely to 
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Further this study 
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demonstrates that these findings hold within a different context and for scenarios where the POC 
and source of the ostensible cause of the service failure are not within the same firm.  
Study 4: Deception Detection Changing the Messenger 
The previous studies have demonstrated that ostensible coincidence is a cue people use to 
detect deception. I have even been able to moderate this effect through varying the degree of 
coincidence by having the same server give different (vs. the same) reasons for three service 
failures. Study 4 accomplishes a similar moderation through the variation of another component 
of the coincidence: the server. If the server is different across the three visits, the level of 
perceived coincidence diminishes and so should the perception of deception.  
Method. One hundred seventy paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Five participants were removed from the analysis due to incomplete responses leaving a 
total of one hundred sixty-five participants included in the analysis. Similar to the first study, this 
study asked participants to imagine they had visited a local restaurant on three different 
occasions and had to wait an excessively long time for their orders. Participants were randomly 
assigned to conditions in a 2 (server: same vs. different) vs. 2 (reasons: same vs. different). Thus, 
participants ended up in four possible scenarios: either they had (i) a different server each visit 
that gave them a different reason for each service failure, (ii) the same server each visit that gave 
them the same reason for each service failure, (iii) the same server each visit that gave them a 
different reason for each service failure, or (iv) a different server each visit that gave them the 
same reason for each service failure. An example of what participants saw can be seen in Table 
4. 
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Table 4: Example Reason for Food Being Late 
 Date Server What your server said about the wait 
Visit 
A 
09/01/2015 Charlie “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
Visit 
B 
09/15/2015 Landry “A cook dropped your food in the kitchen” 
Visit 
C 
09/30/2015 Skyler “The kitchen made a mistake and had to remake your food.” 
 
Server names were selected on the basis that they could be either male or female names 
as to not bias the results. In the same server conditions, Charlie was the server as this is generally 
considered the most androgynous name.  
Similar to study 1, participants rated the extent to which they believed the reasons for all 
service failures on one screen, then indicated how much they believed the overall reasons the 
server(s) gave for their food being late. Further, participants were asked to indicate to what 
extent they believed the food being delayed was the server’s fault or the kitchen’s fault during 
each individual visit. Participants were also asked to respond to an open ended question and 
indicate why they believed their food was delayed. 
Results. In a divergence from the formatting of other studies within this paper, I look at 
overall belief across visit first in this Study 4. I do this because most readers will find all the 
information they need to inform them of the outcome of this study from this simple measure; 
however, for readers looking to fully understand the change in belief across visit, that 
information follows.  
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Figure 8: Mean of Overall Believe Across Conditions 
  
The number of servers (same vs. different) and number of reasons (same vs. different) did 
not significantly interact to influence participants’ overall beliefs in the reasons they were given 
(F(1,160) = .06, p > .8). However, consistent with the predictions and the visit-specific belief 
results, participants’ overall belief was significantly lower when they received the same (vs. 
different) reasons (M = -1.98 vs. .24; F(1,160) = 23.12, p < .0001) and when those reasons were 
supplied by a single server (vs. different servers; M = -2.08 vs. .30; F(1,160) = 27.12, p < .0001). 
These results are particularly interesting because they demonstrate that changing the server while 
keeping the reason constant or changing the reason while keeping the server constant across 
visits systematically affects participant’s belief in the reason given for the service failure in a 
similar way. The full pattern of these results is presented in Figure 8. Thus, giving the theory that 
the level of coincidence is responsible for detecting deception in these scenarios. 
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Table 5: Mean of Change in Belief and Fault Across Conditions and Visits 
 
Server Different Different Same Same 
Reason Different Same Different Same 
Believe ΔVisit B -0.44 -1.73 -1.68 -2.73 
 ΔVisit C -0.05 -2.80 -1.89 -5.51 
Kitchen Fault ΔVisit B 0.80 -0.78 -0.03 -2.67 
 ΔVisit C 0.46 -1.08 -0.50 -4.96 
Server Fault ΔVisit B -2.10 0.48 -0.71 2.40 
 ΔVisit C -1.12 0.65 -0.18 4.40 
 
A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors server (same vs. different) and reason 
(same vs. different), and the repeated within-subjects measure of belief revealed a significant 
interaction between server and belief (F(2,320) = 10.67, p < .0004) and between reason and 
belief (F(2,320) = 21.32, p < .0001). However, the three-way interaction between server, reason, 
and belief was not significant (F(2,320) = .69, p > .45). In combination, these results reveal that 
the two potential sources of coincidence in this scenario (same server and same reasons) 
additively influence participants’ belief in the reasons they are given. Varying either the number 
of sources (servers in this study) or number of reasons independently influences consumers’ 
beliefs.  
When looking at how participant’s beliefs evolved across visits, we see the expected 
pattern of results. ΔVisit B belief (the change in belief from Visit A to Visit B) was significantly 
more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different servers: M = -2.25 
vs. -1.07; F(1, 163) = 5.70, p < .02). Likewise, ΔVisit B belief was significantly more negative 
when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M = -2.26 vs. -1.04; F(1, 163) 
= 6.12, p < .02), replicating the previous results. This pattern persisted and strengthened for 
ΔVisit C belief (the change in belief from Visit A to Visit C). ΔVisit C belief was significantly 
more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different servers: M = -3.86 
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vs. -1.41; F(1, 163) = 13.34, p < .0004). Likewise, ΔVisit C belief was significantly more 
negative when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M = -4.24 vs. -.94; 
F(1, 163) = 26.05, p < .0001) , replicating the previous results. Number of servers and number of 
reasons did not significantly interact for either ΔVisit B (F(1, 163) = .06, p > .80) or ΔVisit C 
(F(1, 163) = .48, p > .49). 
A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors server (same vs. different) and reason 
(same vs. different), and the repeated within-subjects measure of server-fault revealed a 
significant interaction between server and sever-fault (F(2,320) = 13.58, p < .0001) and between 
reason and server-fault (F(2,320) = 28.52, p < .0001). The three-way interaction between server, 
reason, and server-fault was significant as well (F(2,320) = 5.21, p < .02). In combination, these 
results reveal that (i) the two potential sources of coincidence in this scenario (same server and 
same reasons) additively influence participants’ attribution of fault to the server and (i) varying 
the coincidental factors of server and reason have a combined influence on how participants 
attribute fault to the server. 
ΔVisit B server-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit B) was 
significantly more positive when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different 
servers: M = .98 vs. -.83; F(1, 163) = 13.70, p < .0004). Likewise, ΔVisit B server-fault was 
significantly more positive when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M 
= 1.49 vs. -1.43; F(1, 163) = 40.34, p < .0001). This pattern persisted and strengthen for ΔVisit C 
server-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit C). ΔVisit C server-fault was 
significantly more positive when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different 
servers: M = 2.30 vs. -.25; F(1, 163) = 17.50, p < .0001). Likewise, ΔVisit C server-fault was 
significantly more positive when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M 
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= 2.64 vs. -.67; F(1, 163) = 32.17, p < .0001). Number of servers and number of reasons did not 
significantly interacted for ΔVisit B (F(1, 163) = 2.96, p > .54) but did significantly interact for 
ΔVisit C (F(1, 163) = 80.76, p < .02). 
A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors server (same vs. different) and reason 
(same vs. different), and the repeated within-subjects measure of kitchen-fault revealed a 
significant interaction between server and kitchen-fault (F(2,320) = 15.74, p < .0001) and 
between reason and kitchen-fault (F(2,320) = 25.32, p < .0001). The three-way interaction 
between server, reason, and kitchen-fault was significant as well (F(2,320) = 5.82, p < .009). In 
combination, these results reveal that (i) the two potential sources of coincidence in this scenario 
(same server and same reasons) additively influence participants’ attribution of fault to the 
kitchen and (i) varying the coincidental factors of server and reason have a combined influence 
on how participants attribute fault to the kitchen. 
ΔVisit B kitchen-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit B) was 
significantly more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different 
servers: M = -1.46 vs. .02; F(1, 163) = 11.23, p < .001). Likewise, ΔVisit B kitchen-fault was 
significantly more negative when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M 
= -1.78 vs. .41; F(1, 163) = 26.98, p < .001). This pattern persisted and strengthen for ΔVisit C 
kitchen-fault (the change in faulting the server from Visit A to Visit C). ΔVisit C kitchen-fault 
was significantly more negative when the reasons were given by the same server (vs. different 
servers: M = -2.92 vs. -.30; F(1, 163) = 19.52, p < .0001). Likewise, ΔVisit C kitchen-fault was 
significantly more negative when the reasons given were the same (vs. different) across visits (M 
= -3.13 vs. 0; F(1, 163) = 29.88, p < .001). Number of servers and number of reasons did not 
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significantly interacted for ΔVisit B (F(1, 163) = 11.48, p > .19) but did significantly interact for 
ΔVisit C (F(1, 163) = 86.90, p < .009). 
Figure 9: Mean of Server/Kitchen Fault Across Visits  
in the Same-Server-Same-Reason Condition 
 
     Although previously shown in Study 2, since I measured the server’s fault for each 
individual visit within the current study we can see that as the server is blamed more in the same-
server-same-reason condition, the kitchen is exonerated of blame as depicted in Figure 9.  
Discussion. The results of Study 4 support the claim that consumers are less likely to 
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Further this study 
demonstrates that these findings are a product of the level of coincidence. By changing the server 
and the reasons across visits, there are less coincidental factors and participants detected less 
deception. Study 4 further demonstrates that the server will be blamed more for the service 
failure as coincidental elements manifest. Further, Study 4 corroborates the findings of Study 3 
by showing that as participants place blame on the messenger they also alleviate blame from the 
ostensible cause. 
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Study 5: Prediction vs. Belief 
 Study 5 contrasts participant’s predictions about the reason for a service failure with their 
belief of that reason, or lack-there-of. It is quite reasonable that a consumer experience repeated 
service failures for a systemic reason. However, when such a seemingly systemic reason is given 
to them by an individual (the POC) plausibly motivated to avoid blame, they tend to discount its 
likelihood and, thus, not believe the POC or the reasons given. If true, then we should see that 
consumers expect a single reason explains repeated (and similar) service failures, yet still be 
surprised and express disbelief if they are told that this is the case. 
Method. As part of a series of unrelated experiments, I recruited two hundred fourteen 
paid participants from Amazon Mechanical Turk. Twenty-one participants were removed from 
the analysis due to incomplete responses leaving a total of one hundred ninety-three participants. 
Similar to the first study, this study asked participants to imagine they had visited a local 
restaurant on three different occasions and had to wait an excessively long time for their orders. 
Half of the participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they were asked to 
imagine a scenario similar to that in the single-reason conditions of previous studies. An example 
of this belief condition can be seen in Table 6. 
Table 6: Example Reason for Food Being Late 
 Date Server What your server said about the wait 
Visit 
A 
two weeks 
ago 
Charlie “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
Visit 
B 
last week Charlie “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
Visit 
C 
today Charlie “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
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The other half of the participants were randomly assigned to a condition in which they 
were asked to imagine a scenario in which the server gave them the same reason for their first 
two visits to the restaurant and, although their food was delayed on the third visit, the server had 
yet to give them a reason. An example of this prediction condition can be seen in Table 7. 
Table 7: Example Reason for Food Being Late 
 Date Server What your server said about the wait 
Visit 
A 
two weeks 
ago 
Charlie “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
Visit 
B 
last week Charlie “The kitchen forgot about your order.” 
Visit 
C 
today Charlie -- 
 
Participants in both conditions were then asked, “What do you believe caused your food 
to be late today?” and were further randomly assigned to two other conditions. The first 
condition gave participants four options to choose from when answering the previous question. 
These consisted of the following: “The kitchen forgot about my order;” “A cook dropped my 
food in the kitchen;” “The kitchen made a mistake and had to remake my food;” and “The server 
(Charlie) was in some way responsible.” This condition was the closed-end condition. In the 
open-end condition, participants were given the same first three options to respond to what 
caused their food to be late; however, the final option was changed to an open-end response field 
that allowed participants to specify any cause. I theorized that if the participants are to predict the 
cause of their food being late on their third visit to the restaurant, they will predict the most 
likely cause to be the coincidental cause for a service delay. However, we theorized that 
participants in an identical parallel scenario that were given reasons by a server would not 
believe the coincidental cause is the actual cause of their service delay. 
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Results. The overwhelming majority of people in the prediction condition indicated that 
the cause of their food being delayed is that the kitchen forgot to make their order (closed-end: 
62% and open-end: 98%). In contrast, significantly fewer participants in the belief condition 
actually believed that the kitchen forgot to make their order when that was the reason the server 
presented them (closed-end: 23% and open-end: 58%). This demonstrates that although a 
systemic cause makes the most probable sense for a repeat service failure, when this cause is 
presented by a motivated source (the POC), it constitutes an ostensible coincidence that 
consumers tend to not believe. Further, participants predicted the server was the cause for their 
food being late a fraction of the time (closed-end: 38% and open-end: 2%). However, when the 
server gave them a reason for their food being late that aligned with this prediction, they tended 
to say the server was the cause for their delayed food (closed-end: 67% and open-end: 25%). 
This demonstrates that not only do consumers not believe a coincidental cause for a service 
failure but they also tend to attribute blame the POC. 
Discussion. The results of Study 5 support the assertion that consumers are less likely to 
believe a single reason presented to them for multiple service failures. Study 5 also supports the 
proposal that it is more probable that a systemic issue is causing the repeat service failures by 
demonstrating that consumers will predict that the single reason is the most likely cause for the 
service failure. However, these participants do not believe it when the single reason is presented 
to them as the reason for the service failure. 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 In this research, I examined the extent to which consumers’ beliefs of the claims made by 
a point of contact (POC) evolved over repeated service failures. I drew on literature from 
deception detection (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Ekman 2009) and coincidence (Dessalles 2006; 
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Dessalles 2008; Dimulescu and Dessalles 2009) to propose that consumers are more likely to 
believe a POC when the POC gives different (vs. the same) reasons for each of the service 
failures. Specifically, I established that ostensible coincidences (the same reason given 
repeatedly for service failures) provided by the POC lead consumers to discount these 
explanations for the service failures. Consumers find ostensible coincidences less believable 
although these coincidences suggest a systemic cause for the service failure that is both more 
likely and more expected by the consumer a priori (study 5). Further, when presented with an 
ostensible coincidence, consumers are more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.  
Theoretical Implications. Paramount to the fundamental goal of consumer behavior 
literature, I utilized the phenomenon of ostensible coincidences to further understand the nature 
and behaviors of consumers. This research introduces the concept of coincidence to the academic 
marketing literature. Moreover, this research contributes to the literature on deception detection, 
by showing how the previously unexamined content cue of ostensible coincidence influences 
deception detection, and the literature on coincidence, by developing a link between coincidence 
and the social construct of disbelief through ostensible coincidences. Lastly, attribution literature 
and service failure literature benefit from the understanding this research provides around 
attributions of blame after the portrayal of coincidence via a POC. 
Managerial Implications. Firms could benefit directly from this research. As mentioned 
in the introduction, many firms appoint a representative to handle all of a particular consumer’s 
needs. Although this undoubtedly has benefits explored in other research, this could have 
potentially negative consequences when considering the findings presented here. This 
phenomenon combined with the transparent business culture that is often promoted as a best 
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practice today, could lead to ostensible coincidences for repeat service failures. Thus, leading to 
a greater likelihood that consumers begin to distrust their service representative. 
Review of Key Findings. Across differing contexts, I reveal that consumers are less likely 
to believe a POC that presents the same (vs. different) reason for repeat service failures and more 
likely to blame the POC presenting the same reason versus different reasons while exonerating 
the ostensible cause of responsibility. I show that consumers predict a systemic cause as the 
reason for multiple service failures; however, if the systemic reason is presented repeatedly by 
the same POC for multiple service failures, the consumer does not believe it. 
Alternative Explanations. The studies presented within this paper support the conceptual 
framework and predictions. However, past research related to deception detection could have 
potentially predicted similar outcomes without the use of coincidence. Truthful people tend to 
take their perceived integrity for granted while liars commonly attempt to appear trustworthy 
(DePaulo, LeMay, and Epstein 1991). Thus, participants could have seen blaming the kitchen as 
an attempt to appear credible and concluded that the server is trying to deceive them. Although, 
one would imagine that the condition in which different reasons were given would appear more 
deceitful in the study if this were the only mechanism acting on belief and deception detection—
since presenting different reasons could appear as an attempt to appear credible. Furthermore, 
liars tend to display an augmented other-focus (Ickes, Reidhead, and Patterson 1986) while using 
first-person singular pronouns less regularly (Newman et al. 2003) in an attempt to detach 
themselves from their lie. Therefore, placing blame on the kitchen could appear to be a telltale 
sign of deceit. However, if this mechanism was at work, one would imagine it would affect 
believability in all conditions of the study equally given that the POC always blames the kitchen.  
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Limitation and Future Direction. As we navigate our everyday lives, unexpected events 
occur often. Within the experimental design employed in this paper, the comparison highlighting 
the coincidence leading to unexpectedness is unambiguous—it is easy to compare the reasons 
given across multiple services failure when they are presented without any noise. In a “real 
world” setting, this comparison might be less apparent—in addition, many other factors may 
pollute such observations. Therefore, one might argue that these findings might not hold in the 
dramatically more intricate setting of everyday life. I contend that the results would hold to the 
extent to which a consumer perceives an ostensible coincidence, and that may be influenced by 
many factors such as the consumers’ memory of past events and cues in the environment that 
might facilitate the recall of such an event. Broadly speaking, I argue that the phenomena 
detailed within this research can be manipulated to be more or less salient—in fact, this salience 
is a driving force in determining if a coincidence is unexpected or not. After all, a coincidence 
would not be influential in determining belief or perceptions of deceit if the coincidence is not 
recognized. Thus, examining how these contextual factors might be accentuated and 
unexpectedness achieved or avoided is an important direction for future research. 
One might also take exception with the hypothetical nature of the experiments. Indeed, 
consumers might respond differently in incentive-compatible conditions. The magnitude of the 
effects would likely be larger in real versus hypothetical conditions for the phenomena being 
examined here, as has been the case in other domains (Kivetz and Simonson 2002). Hence, the 
results here may very well be muted relative to what would be expected if a consumer personal 
welfare was actually at stake. That said, future researchers may very well wish to determine the 
robustness of the current results in contexts in which the consumer may actually gain or lose via 
repeated interactions with the firm. 
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Admittedly, this research could benefit from a more managerial-oriented dependent 
variable—firm trust, customer loyalty, customer satisfaction, brand switching, and willingness to 
return are all dependent variables for future research that ostensible coincidence could potentially 
impact. This is apparent when we consider the practices of business transparency and assigning a 
single service representative to a customer. Although there is a plethora of research that already 
demonstrates that the relationship a consumer has with a firm’s representative will affect their 
relationship with the firm (i.e., (Hallowell 1996; Winer 2001)), establishing this link directly 
with instances of ostensible coincidence would be ideal. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
Who Do I Believe Now? The Influence of Scarcity Presentation on Credibility and Purchase 
Behavior 
 
Firms communicate with consumers through a variety of actions ranging from 
multifaceted mass-media advertising campaigns to simple shelf layout decisions. Media literate 
consumers are skeptical of most communication presented by a firm—consumers are becoming 
more keenly aware that all communication, no matter how seemingly trivial, is thoughtfully 
designed to coerce them into thinking, feeling, or doing something in relation to the firm that is 
the source of the message. As e-commerce takes a larger share of consumers’ wallets, traditional 
interactions (e.g. salespersons calling on consumers) between the firm and the consumer are 
replaced by websites and applications. As digital means of acquiring goods and services become 
more commonplace than direct interaction with a salesperson in a brick-and-mortar setting, 
consumers may assume there is less chance for the firm to use persuasive tactics of them. In 
reality, consumers might more susceptible to firms’ persuasive strategies in this scenario. 
 One such example of coercive communication prevalent in websites is scarcity signals. In 
marketing, scarcity is a well-researched topic—we know that the scarcity of goods and services 
affect consumer behavior. Marketing scholars have identified that scarcity increases purchase 
behavior because consumers infer that scarcer products are of higher popularity or quality (Van 
Herpen, Pieters, and Zeelenberg 2009), consumers typically choose popular products since they 
think other consumers are more knowledgeable (Cialdini 1993), scarcity enhances the perceived 
value of products and opportunities (Cialdini and Garde 1987), and scarcity induces arousal and 
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this heightened arousal polarizes the evaluations of individual items contained in the choice set 
(Zhu and Ratner 2015). Prior research demonstrates that scarcity signals relative to a firm’s 
product tend to have an impact on product choice in favor of the firm. 
 Firms are well aware of the effects of scarcity and utilize them as sales tactics to persuade 
consumers, even going as far as communicating artificial scarcity of products and services (Kain 
2017). Companies communicate scarcity signals for products to create a sense of urgency, in 
hopes of impulse purchases, where such scarcity might not exist in reality. There are numerous 
web posts that question the authenticity of the message, “Only 1 Left in Stock—Order Soon” 
(""Only One Left!"—the Latest Online Marketing Ploy"  2014). Conversely, in some cases, 
consumers assume scarcity signals communicated by the firm are objective or inherently valid. 
This research focuses on understanding one driving factor in whether increasingly skeptical and 
media-literate consumers are susceptible to being coerced by scarcity signals controlled directly 
by the firm. 
 Consider the following simple yet familiar scenario. A consumer visits an airline’s 
website to purchase a ticket for upcoming travel. The consumer finds a direct flight with an 
acceptable departure time and is presented with a message that indicates there is a limited 
number of seats remaining on the flight. The consumer could reasonably believe this message 
and treat the scarcity signal as credible, thus, placing an additional impetus to act fast and reserve 
a seat before it is no longer an option. Contrariwise, the consumer could view this message as a 
ploy by the airline to get consumers to book the ticket immediately rather than wait to see if the 
price drops or price shop other competing airlines. With this context in mind, imagine that 
instead of seeing a message about a limited number of seats remaining the consumer saw a 
graphic representing the seat availability in the cabin of the aircraft and only a limited number of 
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seats were highlighted as available. In both scenarios, the scarcity signal originated from and is 
controlled by the same source—the airline. However, is one message perceived as more 
believable by consumers? If so, what makes one scarcity signal more believable than another? 
Finally, does this belief translate into different purchasing patterns? 
Across multiple studies, I focus on firms’ different approaches to communicating scarcity 
signals and how these signals are perceived by consumers. Objectively speaking, scarcity signals 
originate and are controlled by the same source—the firm. Therefore, each signal should be met 
with equal consumer skepticism. Yet, I predict that consumers are more likely to perceive a 
scarcity signal as believable under certain conditions. I argue that if the consumer is an active 
agent in uncovering or interpreting the scarcity signal, they will perceive the signal as more 
authentic. Furthermore, in accordance with scarcity literature, the believable scarcity signal will 
favorably affect purchase intentions and behaviors for the firm. 
THEORY 
 Extant research has examined persuasion in a plethora of contexts. It is unsurprising then 
that belief is a headlining construct of interest in much research on persuasion (Friestad and 
Wright 1995) and advertising (Mitchell and Olson 2000). Conversely, belief is often either 
ignored or taken for granted in research on other, generally considered, non-persuasive firm-
consumer communication domains. Yet, it would be erroneous to assume that consumers 
inherently believe claims generated by the firm in non-persuasion contexts. In fact, any context 
in which a firm might benefit from dishonesty is one in which consumer disbelief may arise 
(Fein and Hilton 1994; Fein 1996; Fein, Hilton, and Miller 1990; Main, Dahl, and Darke 2007). 
Furthermore, research does show that a brand’s credibility affects the formation of consideration 
sets (Erdem and Swait 2004). Therefore, consumers are likely to recognize that what they are 
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told and what actually is might differ. Hence, consumers may have grounds to disbelieve firm 
generated messages. 
Persuasion. The Persuasion Knowledge Model (PKM) investigates consumers’ 
awareness about the strategies and tactics that firms employ to convince them to buy a product 
and the motives behind such strategies (Friestad and Wright 1994). This model begins to address 
consumers’ personal knowledge related to firm’s goals and tactics. Consumers refine their 
knowledge on persuasive tactics and manage persuasive messages while dynamically adjusting 
their attitudes toward the product and the firm. If we apply PKM to both conditions in the 
previous airline example, we begin to have an understanding of the active variables at work in 
either coercing consumers to act on or ignore scarcity signals. Perhaps consumers already have 
knowledge associated with explicit scarcity signals (i.e. “Only one remaining, act now!”). This 
cue could be seen as intended by the firm to mean the product is scarce or could be seen as a cue 
that the firm is simply trying to get you to purchase the firm’s goods or services quickly. While 
the more implicit method of allowing the consumer to infer scarcity does not conjure this same 
knowledge because it is not registered as a persuasive attempt. But why would this be the case if 
the source of information is the same? Perhaps, as far as the consumer is concerned, the source 
of the information is not the same. 
Activation Template. The consumer, being actively involved in discovering a scarcity 
signal, will no longer perceive that the signal came from the firm but that they are responsible for 
uncovering it. The effort of interpretation shifts the perceived message source from external to 
internal. The activation template, or the activation version of the interactive experiment template, 
comes from Goldenberg et al.’s work to understand creativity (1999a, 1999b). The authors argue 
that requiring a consumer to engage in an interactive experience with a persuasive message will 
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be thought of as more creative and encourages comprehension of the message (Goldenberg, 
Mazursky, and Solomon 1999a). Although there is empirical evidence that messages or products 
crafted through this template are thought of as more creative (Goldenberg, Mazursky, and 
Solomon 1999b), there is little empirical evidence that messages or products crafted with this 
template are more persuasive or, critically, more believable. However, this research aims to 
rectify this—at least in relation to scarcity signals.  
I attempt to show that when one applies the activation template to scarcity signals, the 
consumer will distribute cognitive resources to understanding the signal and not to understanding 
the underlying coercive nature of the signal. Thus, the consumer will systematically reach an 
understanding that the product is scarce but will not treat this scarcity signal in accordance with a 
persuasive message in PKM. Therefore, consumers in the example that are presented with a 
graphic representing the limited seat availability in the cabin of the aircraft will uncover the 
scarcity of the available seats for themselves. Thus, in this condition, the consumer will assume 
they must make a purchase decision quickly. Conversely, when a consumer is presented with an 
explicit scarcity signal (ie. “Only 3 Seats Left!”), they will question the credibility of the source 
and believability of the message in accordance with PKM. This will ultimately be incorporated 
in their decision process. 
Explicit Scarcity Signal and Believability. Consumers are skeptical towards a firm 
generated message, and skepticism negatively affects believability. Consumers are plausibly 
aware that explicit scarcity messages are a sales tactic, which decreases believability of this 
tactic in the future according to PKM. Content and valence of these positive or negative thoughts 
depends on the information that is available to the consumer at the time of evaluation (Feldman 
and Lynch 1988). Importantly, when consumers become aware of persuasion attempts directed at 
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them, they often use their persuasion knowledge to resist these attempts, hence consumers would 
be relatively less likely to choose scarcer alternatives (Friestad and Wright 1994). I argue that 
explicit scarcity signals trigger this coping behavior in consumers. 
H1: Communicating with consumers through explicit scarcity signals has a negative 
effect on believability of the message, which decreases purchase likelihood, because it is 
perceived as a persuasion attempt on behalf of the firm.  
Implicit Scarcity Signal and Believability. Friestad and Wright suggest that as a 
consumer’s familiarity with a persuasion coping task increases, the cognitive effort they expend 
to do those coping tasks decreases and aspects of their coping behavior become automatic 
(1994). Additionally, scarcity tends to impact choices among consumer goods only when 
consumers believe that market forces have caused that scarcity (Verhallen and Robben 1994; 
Worchel, Lee, and Adewole 1975). Since explicit scarcity signals will be interpreted as a 
persuasion attempt, the believability will decrease, and therefore scarcity will be perceived as an 
artificial phenomenon instead of a natural one (i.e. market forces causing scarcity). The opposite 
is expected to hold for implicit scarcity signals—since it is the consumer who inferred the 
scarcity through cognitive elaboration, they perceive the information is not coming from the 
same source. Presence of an implicit scarcity signal will involve consumers in discovering the 
scarcity signal through increased cognitive effort. This involvement will allow the consumer to 
treat the scarcity signal as a non-persuasive message. Thus, the consumer will not register a 
persuasive attempt and draw on their persuasive knowledge but instead will apply credibility to 
the scarcity signal. Ultimately, the purchase likelihood of the consumer will be greater with an 
implicit scarcity signal. 
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H2: Communicating with consumer through implicit scarcity signals has a positive effect 
on believably of the message, which increases purchase likelihood, because it is not perceived as 
a persuasion attempt by the firm and the scarcity signal is perceived as discovered by the 
consumer. 
STUDIES 
Figure 10: Graphic showing Available Seats in an Aircraft
 
 
Study 1: Indirect vs. Direct Scarcity Signals – Airline Scenario  
In order to investigate this hypotheses, the experiment placed participants in a 
hypothetical scenario similar to the airline example in the introduction. The goal of this study is 
demonstrate that implicit and explicit scarcity signals differ in consumers’ perception. 
Specifically, consumers are less likely to believe explicit (vs. implicit) scarcity signals. 
Furthermore, consumers are less likely to purchase when exposed to an explicit (vs. implicit) 
scarcity signal. 
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Figure 11: Graphic showing Available Seats in an Aircraft in Text 
 
 Method. One hundred and thirty-six paid participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Two participants were removed from the analysis for failing to respond to all 
questions, leaving one hundred and thirty-four participants. Participants were asked to imagine 
they had an upcoming optional business trip and had been instructed to book your domestic 
flight using your company credit card; therefore, price is no concern. Upon visiting the company 
designated airlines website to check for available tickets, the consumer found an available non-
stop flight in the main cabin.  
Participants were then randomly assigned conditions in a 2 (plane schematic: yes vs. no) 
v. 2 (explicit scarcity: yes vs. no). Thus, participants ended up in four possible scenarios: either 
they were presented with a graphic showing the available seats in an aircraft, Figure 10 
(implicitPicture), presented with a graphic showing the same available seats in a text based 
format, Figure 11 (implicitText), showed the same graphic as the first condition except it 
featured red text that stated, “Hurry up! Only 3 seats are left” (explicitPicture), or showed the 
same graphic as the second condition except it featured red text that stated, “Hurry up! Only 3 
seats are left” (explicitText). 
Participants then indicated how likely they were to purchase a ticket on a seven-point 
scale ranging from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7”. On another page, 
participants were asked if they believed the messaging regarding the seats offered by the airline 
(“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Furthermore, on the same page, 
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participants were asked to what extent their purchase decision was influenced by the seat 
locations, seat availability, and number of seats in three separate measures (“Not At All 
Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). Lastly, participants were asked to what extent they felt 
pressured to make the purchase by the airline (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 
7”). On a separate screen, participants were asked their gender and age prior to thanking them for 
their participation. 
Figure 12: Mean of Purchase Across Conditions 
 
Results. A mixed ANOVA of the between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) 
and the between-subjects measure of purchase likelihood revealed a significant difference 
(F(1,130) = 4.14, p < .05). Analysis of the between-subjects factors explicit scarcity statement 
(yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of purchase likelihood revealed a significant 
difference (F(1,130) = 9.71, p < .003). Finally the analysis of the between-subjects factors plane 
schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the between-subjects 
measure of purchase likelihood revealed a significant interaction (F(1,130) = 4.33, p < .04). In 
combination, these results reveal that (i) the two potential sources scarcity signals in this scenario 
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additively influence participants’ likelihood to purchase and (ii) varying the scarcity factors have 
a combined influence on participants’ likelihood to purchase.  
A contrast between the implicit and explicit conditions showing the schematic of the 
plane demonstrates a significant difference in likelihood of purchase (F(1, 130) = 13.51, p < 
.0004). Thus, participants are significantly more likely to purchase a seat when presented with an 
implicit than an explicit scarcity signal in relation to the schematic of the plane. A similar 
contrast between the implicit and explicit text conditions shows no significant difference (F(1, 
130) = .54, p > .45). Thus, there is no evidence that participants are more likely to purchase a 
seat on the plane when shown an implicit than an explicit scarcity signal in relation to the text. 
Interestingly, a contrast between the explicit schematic of the plan and the explicit text shows a 
significant difference (F(1, 130) = 8.67, p < .004). These results demonstrate that participants are 
more likely to purchase a seat on the plane when showed the explicit scarcity signal paired with 
text than paired with a schematic of the plane. 
Figure 13: Mean of Message Belief Across Conditions 
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As shown in Figure 13, the analysis on the manipulated between-subjects factors plane 
schematic (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of message belief revealed no 
significant difference (F(1,130) = 1.28, p > .26). Analysis of the between-subjects factors 
explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of message belief a 
significant difference (F(1,130) = 10.82, p < .002). Finally the analysis of the between-subjects 
factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the between-
subjects measure of message belief revealed no significant interaction (F(1,130) = .93, p > .33). 
In combination, these results reveal that (i) showing participants explicit scarcity signals 
additively influence participants’ belief in the scarcity signal and (ii) varying the scarcity factors 
have no combined influence on participants’ belief in the scarcity signal.  
A contrast between the implicit and explicit conditions showing the schematic of the 
plane demonstrates a significant difference in belief in the messaging (F(1, 130) = 9.05, p < 
.004). In other words, participants believe the message more when shown implicit than an 
explicit scarcity signal accompanying a schematic of the plane. A similar contrast between the 
implicit and explicit text conditions shows no significant difference (F(1, 130) = 2.70, p > .1). 
Thus, there is no evidence participants believe the message more when shown implicit than an 
explicit scarcity signal accompanying text of the seat locations. A contrast between the explicit 
picture of the plane and the explicit text shows no significant difference (F(1, 130) = 2.30, p > 
.1). Similarly, a contrast between the implicit schematic of the plane and the implicit text shows 
no significant difference (F(1, 130) = .02, p > .8). Thus, there is no evidence suggesting a 
difference between similar conditions of the text vs similar conditions of the schematic across 
scarcity signals.  
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Figure 14: Mean of Pressure to Purchase Across Conditions 
 
As shown in Figure 14, the analysis on the manipulated between-subjects factors plane 
schematic (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of pressure to purchase revealed no 
significant difference (F(1,130) = 1.02, p > .31). Analysis of the between-subjects factors 
explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no) and the between-subjects measure of pressure to purchase 
revealed a significant difference (F(1,130) = 19.33, p < .0001). Finally the analysis of the 
between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), 
and the between-subjects measure of pressure to purchase revealed no significant interaction 
(F(1,130) = 5.46, p > .03). In combination, these results reveal that (i) showing participants 
explicit scarcity signals additively influence participants’ pressure to purchase and (ii) varying 
the scarcity factors have no combined influence on participants’ pressure to purchase. 
A contrast between the implicit and explicit conditions showing the schematic of the 
plane demonstrates no significant difference in pressure to make the purchase by the airline (F(1, 
130) = 2.12, p > .1). A similar contrast between the implicit and explicit text conditions shows a 
significant difference (F(1, 130) = 22.67, p < .0001). Therefore, even though there is no evidence 
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to suggest people are affected by the differing scarcity signals in non-congruent ways when the 
schematic is present, there is evidence to suggest they are when only shown the text. A contrast 
between the explicit schematic of the plane and the explicit text shows a significant difference 
(F(1, 130) = 5.38, p < .03). Conversely, a contrast between the implicit schematic of the plan and 
the implicit text shows no significant difference (F(1, 130) = .97, p > .3). 
The analysis of the between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit 
scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the between-subjects measure of seat availability revealed no 
significant omnibus (F(3,130) = 1.41, p > .24). Similar analysis of the between-subjects factors 
plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity statement (yes vs. no), and the between-
subjects measure of seat location revealed no significant omnibus (F(3,130) = 1.42, p > .24). 
Lastly, analysis of the between-subjects factors plane schematic (yes vs. no) and explicit scarcity 
statement (yes vs. no), and the between-subjects measure of number of seats revealed a 
marginally significant omnibus (F(3,130) = 2.52, p < .07). Therefore, no evidence is present to 
suggest that participants were influenced to purchase or not by the seat availability and location; 
however, participants purchase was marginally influenced by the number of seats available. The 
only contrast that showed significance for number of seats was that of the implicit and explicit 
text conditions (F(1, 130) = 5.68, p < .02).  
Discussion. Taken together, these results are convoluted at best—although, several 
significant differences can be seen between conditions, the more granular contrasts of these 
conditions indicate that it is not necessarily consistent with the hypotheses. Second, there is the 
issue that the conditions in which the schematic is shown, gives more information than the 
conditions with just the text. In the schematic, consumers are better able to understand the size of 
the plane, the position of the seats, etc. Lastly, using the words “hurry up” prior to the direct 
Gregory S. Cohen – Dissertation 
 
scarcity signal can be easily interpreted as a persuasive message. Therefore, study two will aim 
to rectify these issues. 
Study 2: Scarcity Signals Information Consistency and No Pressure – Movie Scenario 
This study is motivated to ensure that all participants see the equivalent amount of 
information across conditions. Furthermore, using phrases like, “hurry up” in conjunction with 
the explicit scarcity signal is a confound that diminishes the finding in the previous study. To use 
this additional impetus to act is outside of the scope of the proposed theory and will certainly 
further bias our results. Study 2 will take shape with these precursors in mind. 
Method. Seventy-five paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk. 
Participants were asked to imagine they were planning to go see a movie with a friend. They 
were told there are two movie premiers that they are interested in seeing. Upon visiting the 
theater’s website to check for available tickets and select their seats, participants were presented 
with a graphic showing Movie 1 and Movie 2 and indicating that they had similar start times and 
needed reserved seating. Unlike in Study 1, participants in all conditions were shown a schematic 
of the seating available in the theater for both Movie 1 and Movie 2. Movie 1 had sixty-five 
available seats all over the theater while Movie 2 only had seven seats remaining. Participants 
were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the first condition was presented with 
just the graphic showing the available seats in each theater (Implicit). The second condition was 
presented with a graphic, shown in Figure 15, showing the same available seats but each theater 
had a statement in red that said “Only 65 Seats Left” for Movie 1 and “Only 7 Seats Left” for 
Movie 2 (Explicit). 
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Figure 15: Movie Graphic for Explicit Condition 
 
Participants then indicated how likely they were to purchase a ticket on a seven-point 
scale ranging from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7” for both Movie 1 and Movie 
2. On another page, participants were asked if they believed the messaging regarding the seats 
offered by the movie theater (“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). 
Furthermore, on the same page, participants were asked to what extent their purchase decision 
was influenced by the seat locations, seat availability, and number of seats in three separate 
measures (“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). On an additional page, 
participants were asked to what extent their purchase decision was influenced by preferring more 
popular movie screenings or less crowded movie screenings. Next, on a separate screen, 
participants were asked to what extent they felt pressured to make the purchase by the movie 
theater and the potential the movie would sell out in two separate measures (“Not At All 
Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 7”). On the final screen, participants were asked an attention 
check question, their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation. 
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Figure 16: Means Across Conditions Movies 
 
Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, two-level, between-subjects 
“purchase” factor for both Movie 1 and Movie 2. As seen in Figure 16, the analysis revealed the 
that the implicit and explicit scarcity signals do not significantly affect purchase likelihood for 
Movie 1(Mimplicit = 5.78, Mexplicit = 5.95, F(1, 73) = .32, p > .5) or Movie 2 (Mimplicit = 2.97, 
Mexplicit = 3, F(1, 73) = .00, p > .9). Similarly, a mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, 
two-level, between-subjects “believe” factor. The analysis revealed that the implicit and explicit 
scarcity signals do not significantly affect belief in the messaging (Mimplicit = 5.86, Mexplicit = 5.71, 
F(1, 73) = .31, p > .5). The analysis related to seat location (Mimplicit = 5.49, Mexplicit  = 5.18, F(1, 
73) = .65, p > .4), seat availability (Mimplicit = 5.78, Mexplicit = 5.61, F(1, 73) = .26, p > .6), and 
number of seats (Mimplicit = 4.92, Mexplicit = 4.95, F(1, 73) = .00, p > .9) all indicated no significant 
differences between conditions. The analysis related to preferring more popular movie 
screenings indicated no significance (Mimplicit = 3.08, Mexplicit = 2.71, F(1, 73) = .72, p > .3) while 
the analysis related to preferring less crowded movie screenings indicated marginal significance 
(Mimplicit = 4.59, Mexplicit = 5.39, F(1, 73) = 2.9, p < .1). Finally, the analysis revealed no 
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significant difference between conditions related to pressure to make a purchase by the movie 
theater (Mimplicit = 2.57, Mexplicit = 2.5, F(1, 73) = .04, p > .8) and pressure that the movie would 
potentially sell out (Mimplicit = 3.24, Mexplicit = 2.97, F(1, 73) = .5, p > .4). 
Discussion. Although this study overcame the inconsistency in amount of information 
given to each condition and the implied persuasive attempt of adding “hurry up” to the direct 
scarcity signal, there was no significant difference between our conditions on all measures. 
Perhaps with a larger sample size, we would see a significant difference in preferring less 
crowded theaters but that does not pertain to the hypotheses at hand. Furthermore, this context is 
particularly poor at getting participants involved. Thus, we will attempt to rectify these issues 
with Study 3. 
Study 3: Scarcity Signals Activation – Car Dealer Scenario 
 Unfortunately, it is difficult to determine exactly why Study 2 did not produce the 
theorized results; however, one potential culprit is participant’s lack of engagement. Study 3 will 
attempt to further participant’s engagement in a plethora of ways. After all, if the study itself 
does not engage participants enough then it will be difficult to determine if the activation theory 
is at work in the implicit scarcity signaling conditions. 
Method. One hundred and one paid participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical 
Turk. Participants were asked to imagine they were in the market for a new car and to answer a 
few questions about the car that interested them the most. Participants were asked what the make 
and model of their new car would be and how much they would be willing to spend at most on 
the new car. Then in an effort to engage with participants more, they imagined a scenario in 
which they go to a car dealership to check out the car they are interested in and find the make 
and model at the dealership for significantly less than the amount they were willing to pay. Their 
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answers from the previous questions about the make, model, and amount are piped in to increase 
engagement (further piped answers will be indicated by [Car Make] [Car Model]). Participants 
were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the participants in the first condition 
were presented with a statement that said, “While checking out the car, the salesperson points out 
that it is the only [Car Make] [Car Model] on the lot” (Explicit). The participants in the second 
condition were presented with a statement that said, “While checking out the car, you notice that 
it is the only [Car Make] [Car Model] on the lot” (Implicit). To even further increase 
participant’s engagement, they were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. 
On another page, participants then indicated how likely they were to purchase the [Car 
Make] [Car Model] on a seven-point scale ranging from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely 
Likely 7”. On another page, participants were asked to what extent they believe they saw all of 
the dealerships inventory and the information provided by the salesperson in two separate 
measures (“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Furthermore, on the 
same page, participants were asked two questions about what extent their purchase decision was 
influenced by the availability of the [Car Make] [Car Model] (“Not At All Influenced 1” – 
“Entirely Influenced 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked to what extent they felt 
pressured to make the purchase by the salesperson and by the dealership in two separate 
measures (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 7”). Lastly, on a separate screen, 
participants were asked their gender and age prior to thanking them for their participation. 
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Figure 17: Means Across Conditions Car Dealer 
 
Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, two-level factor (Implicit and 
Explicit) and all between-subjects measures. As seen in Figure 17, the analysis revealed a 
marginally significant difference on purchase likelihood (purchase) between conditions (MImplicit 
= 5.10, MExplicit= 4.57, F(1, 99) = 2.99, p < .09), which indicates that participants’ purchase 
likelihood was marginally significantly different depending on if the scarcity signal was explicit 
or implicit. Unfortunately, the analysis reveals no significant difference between conditions in 
the belief participants saw all of the dealerships inventory (allInventory) (MImplicit = 4.23, 
MExplicit= 4.09, F(1, 99) = .16, p > .6) or in what the salesperson told participants (believeSales) 
(MImplicit = 4.08, MExplicit= 4.51, F(1, 99) = 1.85, p > .1). Thus, indicating that the persuasion 
knowledge model was most likely not triggered differently with explicit vs. implicit scarcity 
signals. This is further confirmed in that analysis revealed no significant difference between 
conditions in either availability measure; purchase influenced by the availability of the [Car 
Make] [Car Model] (availability1) (MImplicit = 4.50, MExplicit= 4.23, F(1, 99) = .61, p > .4) and 
purchase influenced by the number of available [Car Make] [Car Model] (availability 2) (MImplicit 
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= 4.29, MExplicit= 3.77, F(1, 99) = .1.92, p > .1). Thus, further demonstrating that participants 
were not influenced by an implicit scarcity signal more than an explicit one. However, the 
analysis does reveal a significant difference between conditions in the amount of pressure to 
make a purchase perceived by the participants in regards to both the sales person (pressSales) 
(MImplicit = 3.10, MExplicit= 3.94, F(1, 99) = 4.92, p < .03) and the dealership (pressDealer) 
(MImplicit = 3.13, MExplicit= 3.98, F(1, 99) = 5.13, p < .03). Thus, indicating that participants felt 
more pressured to make a purchase when explicit scarcity signals were used. 
Discussion. Although this study attempted to engage participants more than previous 
studies, there is still lacking evidence that consumers believe implicit scarcity signals more than 
they believe explicit signals. Although only marginally, it is interesting to see some difference 
between implicit and explicit scarcity signals on purchase likelihood. Furthermore, it is apparent 
that even without the implied persuasion of a “hurry up” statement, participants still felt more 
pressured to make a purchase when presented with an explicit scarcity signal than when 
presented with an implicit scarcity signal. 
Study 4: Scarcity Signals Choice – Wine Store Scenario 
In Study 4, I attempt to make persuasion overtly apparent across all conditions—
although, this should equally effect implicit and explicit scarcity conditions, this will make it 
easier to see the distinction between them if our hypotheses hold. In the explicit condition, we 
should see participants resist the persuasive attempt in a more exaggerated fashion than in Study 
2 and 3. Furthermore, in the implicit condition, participants should be more willing to assume the 
scarcity signal is authentic and act accordingly. 
Method. One hundred and forty-five paid participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Participants were first asked to provide some example of ways they thought 
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retailers attempt to convince them to buy products. This was designed to prime them to be aware 
of persuasive tactics and should equally effect both conditions. Unfortunately, in other studies, it 
is difficult to tell if participants detected a persuasive element; therefore, priming them to be 
aware of persuasive attempts should help. 
Figure 18: Wine Graphic   
 
On a separate page, participants were asked to imagine they were running early on their 
way to a friend’s house and decided to stop in a wine store to see if there is anything they could 
share with their friend. On a separate page, participants are told that it is only them and the clerk 
in the store, so they have the clerk’s undivided attention and the clerk helps discuss wine options. 
The clerk and participants narrow the wine selection down to two bottles Wine A and Wine B. 
Participants are shown a picture of the two identical bottles only differing in the letter label 
(Figure 18). Participants were then randomly assigned to one of two conditions—the participants 
in the first condition were presented with a statement that said, “You are leaning toward 
purchasing Wine B. While looking at the display, the clerk points out that there are only two 
bottles of Wine A remaining” (Explicit). The participants in the second condition were presented 
with a statement that said, “You are leaning toward purchasing Wine B. While looking at the 
display, you notice that there are only two bottles of Wine A remaining” (Implicit). Participants 
were told that they were leaning toward purchasing the less scarce selection of Wine B to further 
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prime and persuasive attempts to get them to switch to Wine A (both explicit and implicit). 
Again, in order to make persuasive attempts as salient as possible in participants’ minds, they 
have been instructed that they already favor one brand. An attempt to pull them away from that 
brand should seem all the more suspicious and further trigger their resistance across conditions. 
Participants were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. Furthermore, participants 
were asked how likely they are to purchase Wine A or Wine B on two seven-point scales ranging 
from “Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7”. On another page, participants indicated to 
what extent they believe they saw all of the wine store’s inventory and to what extent there are 
less bottles of Wine A in the store than Wine B in two separate measures (“Completely DO NOT 
Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Furthermore, participants were asked to what extent their 
purchase decision was influenced by the availability of Wine A and, in a separate measure, the 
availability of Wine B in three separate measures (“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely 
Influenced 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked if they felt pressured by the clerk to 
purchase Wine A and, in a separate measure, pressured by the clerk to purchase Wine B (“Not At 
All Pressured 1” – “Entirely Pressured 7”). On another screen, participants were asked an 
attention check question, their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation. 
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Figure 19: Means Across Conditions Wine Store 
 
Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, two-level, between-subjects 
factor (Implicit and Explicit). As seen in Figure 19, the analysis revealed no significant 
difference on purchase likelihood for Wine A between conditions (MImplicit = 4.12, MExplicit= 3.68, 
F(1, 143) = 2.16, p > .1), which indicates that participants’ purchase likelihood for Wine A (the 
scarcer wine) was not different depending on if the scarcity signal was explicit or implicit. 
Similarly, the analysis revealed no significant difference on purchase likelihood for Wine B 
between conditions (MImplicit = 4.36, MExplicit= 4.74, F(1, 143) = 2.24, p > .1), which indicates that 
participants’ purchase likelihood for Wine B was not different depending on if the scarcity signal 
was explicit or implicit. Unfortunately, the analysis revealed no significant difference on the 
belief participants saw all of the wine in the store’s inventory (MImplicit = 3.61, MExplicit= 3.54, 
F(1, 143) = .06, p > .7) and to what extent participants believed there are less bottles of Wine A 
in the store than Wine B (MImplicit = 4.87, MExplicit= 4.65, F(1, 143) = .57, p > .4). Thus, offering 
no evidence that participants believed implicit scarcity signals more than explicit signals. 
Although, there was no significance to purchase likelihood or believability of the scarcity 
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signals, analysis revealed that there was a significant difference between being exposed to an 
explicit or implicit scarcity signal in relation participants being influenced by the availability of 
Wine A (MImplicit = 4.21, MExplicit= 3.35, F(1, 143) = 6.10, p < .02) and Wine B (MImplicit = 3.94, 
MExplicit= 3.31, F(1, 143) = 4.17, p < .05). Thus, indicating that participants felt more influenced 
by availability of the wines when they were exposed to an implicit (vs. explicit) scarcity signals. 
Finally, the analysis showed significant difference in pressure to purchase Wine A between 
conditions (MImplicit = 2.57, MExplicit= 3.68, F(1, 143) = 13.41, p < .0005) and no significant 
difference to purchase Wine B between conditions (MImplicit = 2.16, MExplicit= 1.99, F(1, 143) = 
.58, p > .4). Thus, indicating that participants were more pressured to purchase Wine A when 
presented with an explicit scarcity signal and also not pressured to purchase Wine B when 
presented with an explicit or implicit scarcity signal relating to Wine A. 
 Discussion. Although we consistently see differences in pressure in Study 3 and 4, we see 
inconsistent indications for purchase likelihood across studies and no indication that belief 
changes related to what scarcity signal a consumer is presented with. In this study, we did see 
indication that consumers feel more influenced to purchase by implicit than explicit scarcity 
signals. The information presented to each participant, regardless of condition, has remained 
consistent in the Study 2, 3, and 4; however, one could argue that all conditions see the implicit 
scarcity signal and the explicit scarcity signal is additional information. Thus, simply by being 
given additional information, participants are somehow more influenced. This will be addressed 
in Study 5. 
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Study 5: Scarcity Signals Additional Information – Wine Store Scenario 
 If the explicit scarcity signal is simply thought of as additional information, then we 
could see pressure to purchase measures rise amongst participants regardless of the scarcity 
signal. This pressure to purchase could simply be interpersonal pressure have nothing to do with 
the scarcity signal—in order to test this, we would need to have a condition where the firm gives 
additional information that does not include an explicit scarcity signal and compare that with the 
explicit scarcity signal conditions. Study 5 aims to do just that. 
Method. One hundred and twenty-nine paid participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Similar to Study 4, participants were first asked to provide some example of 
ways they thought retailers attempt to convince them to buy products. On a separate page, 
participants were asked to imagine they were running early on their way to a friend’s house and 
decided to stop in a wine store to see if there is anything they could share with their friend. On a 
separate page, participants are shown the graphic in Figure 20 and told they are considering two 
wines; Wine A and Wine B. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of three conditions. 
The participants in the first condition were shown no further manipulations—the graphic itself 
illustrates that Wine A is scarce (Implicit). The participants in the second condition were shown 
the graphic in Figure 20 as well as a statement that says, “The clerk points out that there are only 
two bottles of Wine A remaining” (Explicit). The participants in the third condition were shown 
the graphic in Figure 20 as well as a statement that says, “The clerk recommends either wine” 
(Control). The third condition represents the control in that participants are still shown further 
information, yet this information does not contain a further scarcity signal.  
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Figure 20: Implicit Scarcity Signal from Study 5 
 
Participants were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. Furthermore, participants 
were asked which wine are they more likely to purchase on a six-point scale that consists of, 
“Definitely Wine A”, “Probably Wine A”, “Maybe Wine A”, “Maybe Wine B”, “Probably Wine 
B”, and “Definitely Wine B”. On another page, participants were asked to what extent their 
purchase decision was influenced by the availability of Wine A and, in a separate measure, the 
availability of Wine B (“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). Furthermore, 
participants were asked if they felt pressured by the clerk to purchase Wine A and, in a separate 
measure, pressured by the clerk to purchase Wine B (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely 
Pressured 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked if they believed the wine store 
controls the inventory customers see, manipulates the inventory customers see, manipulated the 
inventory of Wine A to communicate scarcity, and attempting to convince you to buy Wine A by 
making it seem more scarce (“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). On a 
separate screen, participants were asked a manipulation check question, attention check question, 
their gender, and age prior to thanking them for their participation. 
Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, three-level, between-subjects 
factor (Implicit, Explicit, Control). The analysis revealed no significant difference on purchase 
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likelihood between conditions (MImplicit = 2.56, MExplicit= 2.54, MControl= 2.74, F(2, 126) = .51, p > 
.5) which indicates that participants’ purchase likelihood for either wine was not different 
depending on if the scarcity signal was implicit, explicit, or implicit with a control of more 
information. Interestingly, although analysis revealed no significant difference in the extent 
participants purchase decision was influenced by the availability of Wine A (MImplicit = 5.42, 
MExplicit= 5.03, MControl= 5.23, F(2, 126) = .59, p > .5), analysis did reveal significant differences 
in the extent participants were influenced by the availability of Wine B between conditions 
(MImplicit = 4.60, MExplicit= 3.95, MControl= 5.02, F(2, 126) = 4.90, p < .01). This indicates that the 
availability of Wine B influences decisions more when explicit scarcity signal is not present. 
Furthermore, analysis showed that there was no significant difference between pressure to 
purchase Wine A (MImplicit = 2.70, MExplicit= 3.28, MControl= 3.47, F(2, 126) = 1.78, p > .1) or 
pressure to purchase Wine B between conditions (MImplicit = 2.37, MExplicit= 1.90, MControl= 2.28, 
F(2, 126) = 1.11, p > .3). Thus far, pressure has demonstrated fairly robust differences between 
the two types of scarcity; however, these results indicate that this difference might have been 
simply from the representative, the clerk in this example, giving any additional information. 
Lastly, analysis showed that all believability measures were not significantly different between 
conditions; believed the wine store controls the inventory customers see (MImplicit = 5.09, 
MExplicit= 5.38, MControl= 4.89, F(2, 126) = 1.18, p > .3), manipulates the inventory customers see 
(MImplicit = 4.58, MExplicit= 4.71, MControl= 4.36, F(2, 126) = .54, p > .5), manipulated the inventory 
of Wine A to communicate scarcity (MImplicit = 4.49, MExplicit= 4.46, MControl= 4.13, F(2, 126) = 
.62, p > .5), and attempting to convince you to buy Wine A by making it seem more scarce 
(MImplicit = 4.58, MExplicit= 4.36, MControl= 4.02, F(2, 126) = 1.26, p > .2). 
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Discussion. Although we consistently see differences in pressure in Study 3 and 4, the 
findings in Study 5 indicate that the difference in pressure felt by consumers might have more to 
do with the fact that a representative is giving them more information than a particular scarcity 
signal. Study 6 will move away from product scarcity and move into deal scarcity. 
Study 6: Scarcity Signals Discounts – Music Store Scenario 
Method. One hundred and seven paid participants were recruited from Amazon 
Mechanical Turk. Similar to Study 4 and 5, participants were first asked to provide some 
example of ways they thought retailers attempt to convince them to buy products. On a separate 
page, participants were asked to imagine they were shopping for a small birthday gift for their 
musician friend. Upon searching the web for potential gift ideas, they find out that a harmonica is 
an affordable gift idea. They go to the website of a popular woodwind instrument company and 
narrow the selection down to one harmonica. Participants were then randomly assigned to one of 
three conditions. The participants in the first condition were shown a graphic similar to that of 
Figure 21 sans the text after “Annual Sale” (Control). This differs from the control used in Study 
5 in that participant are shown no scarcity signal whatsoever here vs. being shown scarcity and 
given additional information. The participants in the second condition were shown a graphic 
matching Figure 21 (Explicit). The participants in the third condition were shown a graphic 
similar to Figure 21 except it featured text in red after “Annual Sale” that read “Available Until 
[piped text featuring a date two days after the participants completed the experiment]” (Implicit). 
This implicit scarcity signal varies from ones used in previous studies—however, the goal of this 
signal is congruent in that it aims to allow participants to discover the scarcity through more in 
depth activation. 
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Figure 21: Explicit Scarcity Signal from Study 6 
 
Participants were then asked to describe the scenario briefly. Furthermore, participants 
were asked how likely they are to purchase the harmonica on a seven-point scale ranging from 
“Extremely Unlikely 1” to “Extremely Likely 7”. Then, in an effort to move from the 
inconsistent dependent measure of purchase likelihood to a measure that could be more effected 
by pressure, participants were asked how satisfied they are with their shopping experience 
“Extremely Unsatisfied 1” to “Extremely Satisfied 7”). On another page, participants were asked 
to what extent their purchase decision was influenced by the availability of the Annual Sale 
(“Not At All Influenced 1” – “Entirely Influenced 7”). Furthermore, participants were asked to 
what extent they felt pressured to purchase the harmonica (“Not At All Pressured 1” – “Entirely 
Pressured 7”). On a separate page, participants were asked if they believed the music store was 
attempting to convince them to buy the harmonica by making the Annual Sale seem scarcer 
(“Completely DO NOT Believe 1” – “Completely Believe 7”). Finally, on a separate screen, 
participants were asked a manipulation check question, attention check question, their gender, 
and age prior to thanking them for their participation. 
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Figure 22: Means Across Conditions Music Deal  
 
Results. A mixed ANOVA was run on the manipulated, three-level, between-subjects 
factors (Implicit, Explicit, Control). As shown in Figure 22, the analysis revealed marginally 
significant difference on purchase likelihood for between conditions (MImplicit = 5.00, MExplicit= 
5.22, MControl= 5.78, F(2, 104) = 2.77, p < .07), which indicates that participants’ purchase 
likelihood was marginally different depending on if the scarcity signal was implicit, explicit, or 
non-existent. However, contrary to our theory and that of other scarcity theories, it indicates that 
consumers are more likely to purchase the harmonica when no scarcity signal is present. 
Furthermore, contrary to our theory, these findings indicate that consumers are more likely to 
purchase the harmonica when explicit scarcity is present than when implicit scarcity is present. 
Unfortunately, the analysis of the newly introduced measure of satisfaction showed no 
significant difference between conditions (MImplicit = 5.26, MExplicit= 5.19, MControl= 5.63, F(2, 
104) = 1.01, p > .3). These results indicate that consumers are not more satisfied with a shopping 
experience if scarcity signals are present or not, regardless of their explicit nature. The analysis 
of the availability measure revealed that there was significant differences between conditions 
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(MImplicit = 4.77, MExplicit= 5.00, MControl= 3.90, F(2, 104) = 4.75, p < .02). These findings indicate 
that consumers again find themselves influenced by the availability of the deal; however, in this 
case, participants are more influenced when the deal is explicitly scarce than when they have to 
exert more resources to discover how scarce it is. Interestingly, the analysis revealed a significant 
difference of pressure between conditions (MImplicit = 3.48, MExplicit= 4.22, MControl= 2.23, F(2, 
104) = 13.71, p < .0001). These findings indicate that consumers feel less pressure when 
presented with no scarcity signal. A contrast between the Control and Implicit conditions further 
demonstrates this (F(1, 104) = 9.76, p < .003). A similar contrast between the Control and 
Explicit conditions shows similar significant difference (F(1, 104) = 26.65, p < .0001). A 
contrast between the Explicit and Implicit conditions shows a marginally significant difference 
(F(1, 104) = 3.20, p < .07). Thus, giving evidence that consumers feel marginally less pressure 
when implicit than when explicit scarcity signals are present. Lastly, the analysis revealed a 
significant difference of belief between conditions (MImplicit = 5.58, MExplicit= 5.92, MControl= 4.35, 
F(2, 104) = 11.15, p < .0001). These findings indicate that consumers believe the music store 
was attempting to convince them to buy the harmonica by making the Annual Sale seem scarcer 
when a scarcity signal is present. A contrast between the Control and Implicit conditions further 
demonstrates this (F(1, 104) = 11.40, p < .002). A contrast between the Control and Explicit 
conditions shows similar significant difference (F(1, 104) = 20.04, p < .0001). However, a 
contrast between the Explicit and Implicit conditions shows no significant difference (F(1, 104) 
= .81, p > .3). These findings indicate that consumers feel no difference in belief that the store is 
attempting to convince them to buy the harmonica when presented with implicit than when 
explicit scarcity signals. 
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Discussion. Although Study 6 covered the novel context of deal scarcity, these results 
indicate that the hypotheses are misguided. Further evidence of this point can be seen in the 
control condition of this study demonstrating how a lack of a scarcity signal acts compared to 
implicit and explicit scarcity. Ultimately, additional studies are unnecessary—the original 
hypotheses do not hold. To note, throughout this empirical approach, several others studies were 
conducted that too closely resemble the studies outlined here to warrant a place in this essay.  
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
In the third chapter of this dissertation, I examined the extent to which consumers’ beliefs 
of scarcity signals presented by a firm difference based on the manner in which those signals are 
delivered. Drawing on literature from creativity (Goldenberg, Mazursky, and Solomon 1999a, 
1999b) and persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1994; Chaiken et al. 1987; Petty and Cacioppo 
1986), I proposed that consumers are more likely to believe implicit (vs. explicit) scarcity 
signals. Specifically, I proposed that implicit scarcity signals require the consumer to engage in 
the communication and alter the perceived source and intention of the scarcity signal. Ultimately, 
the hypotheses indicated that the consumer would no longer feel the source of the scarcity signal 
is the firm and that the intentions are to persuade the consumer. Further, when presented with an 
implicit scarcity signal, consumers are more likely to believe the signal is authentic and alter 
their purchasing behavior to match previous scarcity literature. Unfortunately, the hypotheses do 
not hold. 
 Theoretical Implications. Since the theory was grounded in prior research, it is worth 
exploring why the hypotheses did not hold. Foremost, it should be examined whether that the 
types of manipulation and strengths of manipulation used in the studies are substandard; 
however, given the amount of studies run and the varying manipulations, this seems less likely 
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than other alternatives. Secondly, the hypotheses not holding could be related to the measures 
being substandard. This is entirely plausible—the measures could have been miscalibrated or 
insensitive to shifts in the underlying constructs. It is possible the measures did not accurately 
communicate the way participants were feeling. Ultimately, the reasons these hypotheses did not 
hold were most likely related to it not being an accurate representation of how consumers 
behave. It would seem that people do not perceive implicit and explicit scarcity signals as being 
different—at least not consistently so. Although a large portion of the theory is based on extant 
research related to how consumers treat persuasive attempts and scarcity signals, the theory is 
also based on the activation template (1999a, 1999b). As stated in the theory introduction, there 
is little empirical evidence that messages or products crafted with this template are more 
persuasive or, critically, more believable. Perhaps perceived effort on the part of the consumer is 
not substantial enough for them to attribute the scarcity discovery to themselves. Furthermore, 
perhaps this effort on the part of the consumer does not offset the source knowledge—i.e. 
consumers ultimately know the information comes from the firm. 
Managerial Implications. Although it is difficult to elaborate on null hypotheses, it stands 
to reason that some of the lack of findings in this essay could be useful to managers. Given that 
purchase likelihood was mostly insignificantly affected by the presence of an explicit (vs. 
implicit) scarcity signal, it would make sense for managers to employ implicit scarcity signals 
when optional. In doing so, managers could avoid much of the perceived pressure exerted by the 
firm on their customers. Although not captured in the studies associated with this paper, perhaps 
this pressure would negatively affect customer relationships, either overtime or per individual 
visit. As the explicit vs. implicit scarcity signals did not make a demonstrable difference in 
likelihood of sale, it would seem worthwhile to reduce the potential for conflict or pressure.  
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Future Direction. Consumers encounter scarcity regularly—unfortunately, from the 
consumer perspective it is almost impossible to confirm if this scarcity is driven by market forces 
or if the scarcity of a product or service is being manipulated to affect the persuasiveness of a 
marketer’s message. Based on the lack of findings accompanying the research, it appears that 
consumers, even primed to be cognizant of scarcity manipulations, do not treat explicit scarcity 
any different than implicit scarcity in regards to the authenticity of the scarcity. In a “real world” 
setting, this comparison might still hold—in addition, many other factors may pollute such 
observations. Therefore, one might argue that these findings would be different in the 
dramatically more intricate setting of everyday life. Therefore, it would be interesting to try a 
similar manipulation to some of the studies in a field experiment. 
When conducting future research about deal scarcity, it is important to note that a deal, 
by nature, is scarce. Therefore, one might argue that the control condition in Study 6 is really the 
most implicit scarcity signal. Ultimately, participants in this condition needed to recognize the 
deal was scarce through their own efforts—not through any mechanism explicitly telling them. If 
this is considered the case, the findings of this study are the most robust in favor of the 
hypothesis throughout the entire paper. Future studies would need to be conducted to determine 
if participants actually perceived the deal as scarce. 
Beyond that, if the lack of findings in the third chapter of this dissertation are any 
indication, it appears that belief is not a factor that needs to be considered when discussing 
scarcity signals. However, perhaps this research could be drawn on to develop a deeper 
understanding of pressure. More specifically, if increased pressure could lead to less 
satisfaction—either with the purchase or the purchase environment. Ultimately, this pressure 
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could influence a customer’s willingness to return to a store or purchase products from an 
organization. 
 Another novel question that stemmed from this research is: are people less skeptical of 
persuasive attempts in digital vs. interpersonal interactions? One could argue that there are more 
cues to go off of in interpersonal communication—since it is much easier to perfectly craft a 
message in a digital context than an interpersonal one. Beyond that, this idea rides a fine line of 
being too obvious and being surprising if people are actually less skeptical and potentially more 
susceptible to persuasive attempts in digital compared to interpersonal contexts. It appears, based 
on the findings, that people feel more pressure from interpersonal than digital communications. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
Summary and Closing Thoughts 
In this dissertation, I argued that belief, more specifically consumers’ belief in claims or 
material generated by the firm, should be more adequately examined in contemporary consumer 
behavior literature. To this end, I reviewed current theories that attempt to understand belief in 
consumer behavior literature. Furthermore, I explored two empirical examinations of how certain 
factors influence consumers’ belief in firm-generated communication and how differing levels of 
belief affect consumer behavior. My goal was to better understand the relationship between 
belief and consumer behavior, and, in particular, how belief can be managed more appropriately 
from both a managerial and a consumer standpoint. 
In the second chapter of this dissertation, I examined the extent to which consumers’ 
beliefs of the claims made by a point of contact (POC) evolve over repeated service failures. I 
draw on literature from deception detection (Ekman and Friesen 1969; Ekman 2009) and 
coincidence (Dessalles 2006; Dessalles 2008; Dimulescu and Dessalles 2009) to propose that 
consumers are more likely to believe a POC when the POC gives different (vs. the same) reasons 
for each of the service failures. Specifically, I established that ostensible coincidences (the same 
reason given repeatedly for service failures) provided by the POC lead consumers to discount 
these explanations for the service failures. Consumers find ostensible coincidences less 
believable although these coincidences suggest a systemic cause for the service failure that is 
both more likely and more expected by the consumer a priori. Further, when presented with an 
ostensible coincidence, consumers are more likely to blame the POC for the service failure.  
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In the third chapter of this dissertation, I conducted research in an attempt to outline the 
extent to which consumers’ beliefs of scarcity signals presented by a firm differ based on the 
manner in which those signals are delivered. Drawing on literature from creativity (Goldenberg, 
Mazursky, and Solomon 1999a, 1999b) and persuasion (Friestad and Wright 1994; Chaiken et al. 
1987; Petty and Cacioppo 1986), I theorized that consumers are more likely to believe implicit 
(vs. explicit) scarcity signals. Specifically, implicit scarcity signals require the consumer to 
engage in the communication and alter the perceived source and intention of the scarcity signal. 
The consumer will no longer feel the source of the scarcity signal is the firm and that the 
intentions are to persuade the consumer. Further, when presented with an implicit scarcity signal, 
consumers should be more likely believe the signal is authentic and alter their purchasing 
behavior to match previous scarcity literature. Unfortunately, my research yielded mostly null 
results. 
Further, I initially hypothesized that believability played an active role in consumer 
interactions. I aimed to help shape the understanding of the role of believability in consumer 
communications through an examination of both communication around ostensible coincidences 
in service failures and in the explicit and implicit communication of scarcity. Given that my 
results across these two aspects of believability achieved differing results, it would appear that 
this broader topic deserves further exploration and that belief should not be assumed or ignored 
as a factor in other evaluations of consumer behavior.  
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